Electoral Politics in the Zero-Sum Society by Kramer, Gerald H.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 
Gerald H. Kramer ..\�1\lUTf OF '" r� 
�'to � 
� "a � ('.'. _, 0 < C'I ...... -< 
� � -,::. !-4.J 
�� '/( < � �t- \ o� �It �4: SHALL h\I'� 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 472 
March 1983 
ABSTRACT 
ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE ZERO-SU.I SOCIETY 
Gerald H. Kramer 
California Institute of Technology 
In most recent work on the theory of elections, parties are 
assumed to compete over a multidimensional space of issues or policy 
variables. Distributional considerations arise only indirectly in 
this structure, and candidates cannot appeal directly to particular 
constituents or groups by offering them specific targeted benefits or 
services. This theory of pure "issue" politics thus ignores the 
prevalent constituent-service aspects of contemporary electoral 
politics. The present paper develops a theory of electoral 
competition under an alternative structure, in which candidates 
compete by directly offering particular benefits and services to 
voters. The analysis presumes a symmetry in the roles of incumbent 
and challenger, in that the former necessarily commits himself to an 
allocation first , by his actions in office, thereby presenting the 
challenger with a fixed target to optimize against. Voters tend to 
discount the challenger' s promises to some degree in comparing them to 
the benefits currently being received under the incumbent , and cast 
their votes so as to maximize the level of benefits received. The 
main results are as follows: 
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1. Optimal candidate strategies in this regime turn out to be 
rather different from those in the classical spatial modeling 
framework. Challengers pursue a "divide and conquer" strategy of 
bidding for a minimum winning coalition of voters. Incumbents, by 
contrast , pursue a more even-handed strategy, attempting to appeal to 
all their constituents. The model thus predicts distinctive 
differences in the behavior of challengers and incumbents,  with no 
tendency for the candidates to converge on a common strategy or 
position, as in the classical Downsian case. 
2. The discount factors voters use in assessing the 
challenger's promises--the "incumbency premia"--can be interpreted as 
a set of constituent demands. If these are treated as endogenous 
strategic variables which voters vary so as to maximize their long-run 
level of the benefits, there exists an equilibrium. In equilibrium, 
voters capture all the benefits from the parties. The degree of 
inequality in the equilibrium allocation is related to the degree of 
risk aversion with which the electorate views candidate behavior. 
3 .  An issue is a measure or proposal which, if enacted, would 
generate a fixed distribution of benefits and costs, and on which each 
candidate must take a position. We obtain simple classification of 
issues according to their electoral consequences, and show that one 
important category of issues--which we label the "controversial" 
issues--is strategically important. The existence of a controversial 
issue invariably work to the disadvantage of the incumbent; hence he 
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always has an incentive to suppress or remove it from the electoral 
arena altogether, if he can. If he cannot, it will then be optimal 
for the incumbent to f avor the issue if and only if it is one which 
produces a (positive) net social benef it. Even with this optimal 
position, however, under general conditions the incumbent will 
nevertheless be defeated, by a challenger who opposed the issue and 
who will therefore not enact it, even though it would be socially 
optimal to do so. These results thus support the doubts expressed by 
Thurow and others, concerning the inability of a competitive 
democratic systems to deal effectively with major issues when 
distributional considerations become politically important. They also 
imply, however, that Thurow's proposed reforms, to strengthen party 
responsibility, would not help, since the problem lies in the nature 
of the competitive process itself. 
m.ECTORAL POLITICS IN nrn ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 
Gerald H. Kramer 
California Institute of Technology 
February 1983 
Theoretical work on electoral competition1 has concentrated 
almost exclusively on a structure in which the candidates or parties 
compete over a space of issues or policy positions. Distributional 
considerations can arise only indirectly in such a setting, and 
candidates cannot appeal directly to particular constituents or groups 
by offering them specific targeted benefits or services. This theory 
of pure "issue" politics thus ignores the prevalent constituent­
service aspects of contemporary electoral politics. In the present 
paper we investigate the nature of a competitive electoral process in 
an alternative, purely allocational, regime, in which candidates 
compete by directly offering particular benefits and services to 
voters. 
0. Summary and Overview 
The basic structure is quite simple: there are two 
candidates, a challenger and an incumbent, who compete for votes by 
promising specific benefits or services to some or all of the n voters 
or groups who comprise the electorate. These benefits and services, 
which are indexed by a single, composite private good, are positively 
valued by all voters, and also by the candidates themselves (or their 
parties and supporters). Each candidate offers an allocation z o JR.n 
__,.. 
of benefits to the electorate, where zi 2 0 is the amount offered to 
voter i, and the offers collectively must satisfy a budget constraint 
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I: i zi �A. If a candidate offering an allocation z receives a 
majority (of m or more votes ,  where m = �1) he wins; each voter i 
then receives the promised amount zi' while the candidate himself 
receives the residual A - I: i zi 2 0, his surplus. The candidate 
wishes to maximize his surplus , 2 so will offer voters only the minimum 
necessary to secure this majority, The losing candidate does not gain 
control of the pool of benefits, and therefore receives no surplus 
himself; we assume that he nevertheless attempts to minimize his 
opponent's surplus , by making his victory as expensive as possible. 
An incumbent, being already in office and having control over 
the pool of benefits in the period preceeding the election, must act 
and actually provide benefits to his constituents during this period. 
He therefore commits himself to a de facto allocation first, before 
the challenger does. On the other hand voters are assumed to discount 
the challenger's promises to some degree in weighing them against the 
actual performance of the incumbent. In particular, if voter i is 
currently receiving a benefit of xi from the incumbent , and is offered 
yi by the challenger, we assume he votes for the challenger only if 
Yi > x1 + pi , where pi is the discount f actor, or incumbency premium, 
of the ith voter. 
These discount factors play an important role in the analysis. 
We can think of them as measures of voters' loyalties to the 
incumbent , since the larger pi is, the more difficult it is for the 
challenger to obtain i's vote. (The pi may therefore be negative as 
well as positive, since some voters' loyalties may be to the "out" 
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party rather than to the incumbent. )  More generally still, however, we 
shall interpret pi as a kind of "price, "  which signals the voter's (or 
group's) availability to bids from either party, The pi are fixed in 
the short run, and both candidates must act as "price-takers" and 
obtain votes by impersonally bidding for them, rather than directly 
negotiating or bargaining with individual voters or groups. In the 
longer run, however, these prices are endogenous , and can be altered 
by the groups themselves if they find it in their interests to do so. 
Thus , a group for whom pi = 0 essentially pursues a policy of short­
run maximization in each election, voting for whichever candidate 
offers it more, with no discounting, If the expected level of 
benefits to the group could actually be increased in the long run by 
applying a positive discount , however, then we would expect pi to 
eventually rise. The incumbency premia thus provide a mechanism for 
constituents to impose demands on the political system, and to oblige 
the parties to cater to these demands. One important question, 
clearly, is whether the pi would keep changing forever, or would ever 
stabilize -- i. e. , whether there exists an eauilibrium set of 
incumbency premia. We address the issue of equilibrium and its 
ramifications in the final section of the paper. 
Initially, however, we take the pi as fixed, and concentrate 
on characterizing the short-run behavior of candidates and voters in a 
single election. Since the challenger can wait until after the 
incumbent has committed himself to an allocation, his optimal 
allocation is easily determined, and is formally characterized in 
Theorems 1 .1 and 1 .2 .  In particular, given the vector p S 1Rn of 
incumbency premia, and the incumbent ' s  allocation x e 1Rn, the 
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challenger must offer at least xi+ pi for i's vote; this quantity (or 
z ero, if it is negative) is thus the "cost" of securing i's vote . The 
task facing the challenger is to secure a majority at the lowest 
possible cost, so his optimal strategy will be to offer slightly more 
than this amount to the m least costly voters, and nothing to the 
others. Challengers thus pursue a "minimal winning coalition" type of 
electoral strategy. 
The problem facing the incumbent is rather different . In 
essence, his task is to make victory impossible, or failing that as 
expensive as possible, for the challenger, by driving np the cost of 
the least-cost coalition. The incumbent therefore generally cannot 
afford to favor some voters and ignore others, for if he did, the 
neglected voters would become easy, "low-cost" targets for the 
challenger. The strategic situation confronting the incumbent thus 
leads him to pursue a more broad-based electoral strategy. Optimal 
allocations for the imcumbent for arbitrary p e ]Rn are partially 
characterized by Theorem 1 .3 and Lemmas 1 .1-1 .4, and are fully 
characterized for the case of most interest, when the incumbency 
premia are in or near equilibrium, by Theorem 1 .4 .  To get some sense 
of the nature of these allocations, suppose the incumbent chooses an 
allocation x > O. The challenger will then bid for some least costly 
majority coalition C of voters. Let zm + pm be the cost of the most 
costly voter in C. If it were true that zi + pi > xm + pm for any 
voter i, the allocation x would not be optimal, for in that case the 
incumbent could either increase his own surplus by offering somewhat 
less to i, or alternatively decrease the challenger' s surplus by 
s 
reallocating some benefits from i to C. By similar reasoning, x would 
also not be optimal if xj + p .  < x + p for any voter j .  J m m Thus, if 
the allocation x is optimal, it must be true that z. + pi = x .  + p. 1 J J 
for all i and j .  Theorem 1 .4 shows that when the underlying 
incumbency premia are near equilibrium ( in the sense of Definition 
(3 .4) ) ,  the incumbent ' s  optimal allocation is of this form, and is 
A 
given by xi = a - pi for all i, (where the quantity a > 0 is defined 
by a =  min ( A/m, 1/n[A + I: i pi]) ) .  Moreover, under the premises of 
A 
the theorem, it also will be true that pi < a, and hence that xi > 0, 
for every voter i. Thus the incumbent, unlike the challenger, offers 
benefits to all voters. 
These results, though straightforward analytically, 
nevertheless contrast considerably with those of the issue-oriented 
Dowhsian or spatial models of electoral competition, and suggest that 
candidates behave quite differently in an allocational setting . In 
the issue-oriented models the competitive process drives both 
candidates to adopt similar positions or strategies. In the 
allocational structure considered here, on the other hand, the 
candidates pursue distinctively different strategies, and show no 
tendency to converge. The nature of the differences are distinctive, 
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and in principle empirically testable: challengers tend to pursue a 
divisive, minimal-winning-coalition type of strategy, while incumbents 
pursue a broad-based strategy, and try to appeal to all their 
3 constituents , These results also imply that a successful challenger 
will change his electoral strategy after taking office, by trying to 
broaden his electoral base beyond his original core of supporters .4 
In section 2 we turn to a different question, and consider the 
role of issues in this structure. By an issue we mean a measure or 
proposal which, if enacted, would generate a fixed distribution 
b e 1R n of benefits (or costs, if bi < 0) to voters, We assume such 
issues are relatively "sparse, ff and arise only occasionally, and only 
one per election; moreover the benefits generated by the issue are 
assumed to be small relative to the pool of allocatable benefits (so 
that, in particular, it is always possible to fully compensate the 
"losers" ( i. e .  those for whom bi < 0) if the proposal is adopteel) . 
With issues as with allocations, the incumbent must commit himself 
first, before the challenger does , (Because of this it is clear an 
issue cannot help an incumbent, since the challenger can always adopt 
the incumbent's position, and effectively neutralize the issue in the 
electoral contest (Comment 3 ,1 ) , )  
Issues are of various kinds . For example a socially 
beneficial (or disadvantageous, respectively) issue is one for which 
I: i bi> 0 (or < 0, respectively). An issue is maj ority-preferred if 
there exists some majority coalition C of voters for whom bi > O for 
all i E C; or is a Pareto-improvement if bi > 0 for all i. A typical 
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"special-interest" issue would be one which conveys large benefits on 
a small minority, while imposing costs on the rest of society, while 
what we might call a "Thurow"-type issue would be one which yields 
significant net social benefit I i bi ) 0 ) ,  yet imposes severe costs 
on some small minority ( which, he argues, constitute an effective veto 
group in a democracy) , (Thurow ( 1980 ) , )  The questions of interest are 
to see how such issues affect the fortunes of the candidates, and how 
the issues themselves ultimately fare in this electoral setting , 
From a strategic point of view, the relevant classification of 
issues turns out to be somewhat different from any of the above, and 
can be described as follows: if b is an issue such that for every 
maj ority coalition C the quantity �c b .  (the sum of benefits over the 1 
members of C) is non-negative, we shall say the issue is a positiye 
one; conversely, if '} b . � 0 for all such C, the issue is negatiye. tic 1 
We define a controyersial issue as one which is neither positive nor 
negative. If voters are indexed in order of their bi' i. e.  so that 
bl � b2 � • � bn' evidently the least-favored maj ority consists of 
voter 1 through m, If we define B-
over this coalition, and similarly B+ 
m 
'} b .  as the sum of benefits 
/=1 1 
n 
� bi as the sum over the pm 
most-favored majority, then evidently b is controversial if and only 
if B- 0 and B+ > 0 ,  
Theorem 2.1 shows that it is optimal for both candidates to 
favor positive issues, and to oppose negative issues, Such issues 
therefore play no real role in the electoral contest, and do not 
affect the outcome, Positive issues will be ul timately adopteo no 
matter which candidate wins ( in particular, Pareto improvements will 
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always be enacted) ,  while negative ones will always be rej ected by the 
winning candidate. To this extent, therefore, the electoral process 
copes with issues in a sensible manner , 
With controversial issues things are more complex, however. 
To see how they affect the candidates, we first consider ( in Comment 
2.2) the simpler situation which results if the issue arises after the 
incumbent has committed himself to an allocation, but before the 
challenger has ,  The incumbent, having previously adopted his optimal 
A 
allocation x, must now take a position on the issue , If he favors the 
issue, the challenger can either match the incumbent ' s  position ( in 
which case he would have to bid a for any vote )  or alternatively 
oppose it (in which case he would have to bid 
A 
Yi= xi+ pi+ bi= a+ bi for i' s vote ) ,  Since the issue is 
controversial, there exists a majority coalition C for which the sum 
'f bi is negative; hence the challenger, by opposing the issue, f:Ec 
can 
obtain this majority at a cost of am+ �
C 
bi < am, so his surplus 
will be greater than if he had favored it. In particular, the 
challenger can always increase his surplus by -B- . Alternatively, if 
the incumbent opposed the issue, the challenger could increase his 
surplus by B
+
, by favoring it. From the incumbent ' s  point of view, it 
is optimal for him to take whichever position minimizes his opponent ' s  
- + surplus ,  and hence to favor the issue if -B � B , or to oppose it if 
this inequality is reversed, The incumbent thus favors an issue if 
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B+ + B- 2 O, or equivalently if L b .  + b 2 0 ( here b is the bene:tit 
1 m m 
of the mth or median voter, when voters are indexed so that 
b1 i b2 i • . .  � bn ) ,  If the median voter' s  benefit bm is negligibly 
small relative to the total social benefit L i bi, the issues the 
incumbent favors and opposes are essentially the socially beneficial 
and disadvantageous ones, respectively. It is always optimal for the 
challenger to take the opposite stand; moreover, under the conditions 
of Comment 2,2, the challenger will prevail in the election, and his 
victory will lead to rejection of the issue if it is socially 
beneficial, or its enactment if it was not .  
A rather perverse outcome thus occurs, at  least when the 
incumbent cannot readj ust his allocation to try to compensate for the 
vulnerabilities created by the issue, The more complex case, in which 
he can optimize over his issue position and allocation simultaneously, 
is analyzed in Lemmas 2.1-2.S , summarized in Theorem 2.2; 
qualitatively, the results are rather similar. The incumbent favors a 
controversial issue if and only if L i bi l 0, i.e. it is socially 
beneficial ( Lemma 2.5), In this case it will be optimal for him to 
allocate more to the "losers" who are disadvantaged by the issue 
(Lemma 2.4); with this allocation either position becomes optimal for 
the challenger ( Lemma 2.3). The incumbent ' s  surplus is strictly less 
than it would have been in the absence of the issue (Theorem 1.4, (2) 
and (3) of Lemma 2.3), and if the issue is divisive enough ( i. e. if 
-B- is large enough) , the challenger will win ((1) of Lemma 2.3). 
Some implications of these results are as fol lows : A rational 
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incumbent favors the public interest (i .e .  favors issues which are 
socially beneficial, and opposes those which are not ) ,  simply because 
this is the most profitable position for him electorally. For a 
controversial issue, however, this is only a "second-best" strategy, 
since such an issue always works to his disadvantage, no matter what 
position he takes on it.5 An incumbent thus has an even stronger 
incentive to suppress controversial issues altogether. To the extent 
that incumbent officeholders can control and manipulate the political 
agenda, therefore, we should expect them to try to keep such issues 
off the agenda; or, failing that, to at least keep them out of the 
electoral arena, for example by referring them to other j urisdictions, 
or the bureaucracy or courts, for resolution . Challengers, on the 
other hand, have the opposite incentive, and at least in the short run 
stand to benefit from having elections fought over controversial 
issues. 6 
With controversial issues and against a rational incumbent, it 
is optimal for the challenger to oppose the incumbent ' s  position, and 
hence to oppose the public intent . Moreover such issues work to the 
advantage of the challenger, so if the incumbent's margin was small or 
nonexistent to begin with, and/or the issue divisive enough, the 
challenger will prevail. The public interest thus fares poorly in 
this electoral process : elections will often be won by candidates who 
oppose measures which would improve the social welfare, or who 
advocated undesirable special interest causes. These findings thus 
support many of Thurow's (1980) conclusions . 7 
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We turn finally to a more fundamental question, concerning the 
equilibrium of the underlying incumbency premia. In the argument so 
far the pi have been taken as fixed. As suggested at the outset, 
however, these are actually policy variables, and in the long run may 
be altered by the various voters or groups themselves, if they find it 
in their interests to do so. Until now the candidates have been the 
only strategically active agents, with voters playing an essentially 
passive role : once confronted by the candidates' offers, voters can 
only cast their ballots and accept whatever benefits have been 
promised by the winning candidate; if his surplus is large, most of 
the benefits will accrue to the candidate and his party, and few to 
the citizens for whom they were presumably originally intended . In 
the longer run, however, the incumbency premia provide a means for 
voters to influence outcomes, and to induce candidates to become more 
responsive to their demands . Thus, for example, in an era in which 
the incumbent is dominant and regularly wins with a large surplus, a 
voter or group which finds itself taken for granted and inadequately 
provided for may seek redress by gradually weakening its loyalties to 
the incumbent . This may encourage the challenger to bid more 
energetically for i' s vote, and possibly even lower the challenger's 
cost sufficiently to enable him to win; even if not, the mere threat 
of defection may induce the incumbent to increase i's benefit, to 
retain his vote. To the extent that such influences increase the 
level of i's expected benefit, it is clearly in i's interest to change 
his incumbency premium accordingly; and we should expect him to 
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eventually do so . The original  n-tupl e p of premia is therefore 
unstabl e, since at l east one group i has both the incent ive and the 
abil ity to change i t, by al tering i ts own component pi . We def ine an 
equilibrium as an n-tuple of incumbency premia which is not unstabl e 
in this sense (Def inition 3.1). 
It is certainly conceivabl e that there is no such equil ibrium, 
and that any p e JR.n is subj ect to cont inual change by some or all 
voters ( for exampl e, by perpetually striv ing to make their pi ever 
smaller, thus driving them towards -m) . As it turns out, however, 
equil ibria can be shown to exist in this structure, and to be rather 
pl aus ible in nature. The equi l ibri a  of interest the "non-
degenerate" ones -- are characterized by Theorem 3.2. Some 
impl ications of this resul t are as follows : 
First, in equil ibrium the surplus to winning candidate is zero 
((4) of Theorem 3.2): all benef its are thus distributed to the 
el ectorate, and none retaine d  by the parties .  In the l ong run, 
therefore, the abi l ity of voters to shift loyal ties does serve as an 
effective control on the behavior of the pol itical el ites, and 
ul timately forces them to use the benefits to increase the wel fare of 
c itizens rather than simply enrich themselves. (This resul t is 
r eminiscent of the zero-profit condition of a competitive economic 
equi l ibrium. ) 
Second, in equil ibrium every voter receives a strictly 
posi tive  level of benef it ((3) of Theorem 3.2). This may at f irst 
gl ance appear to be a so1:1ewhat " egal itari an" outcome. In the more 
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rel evant wel fare sense, however, it is not, since it takes no account 
of underlying income or social inequal ities .  Indeed, since many of 
the benefits in question arise from programs or pol icies intended to 
redress these underlying inequalities, social equi ty is promoted by 
providing them to the needy or disadvantaged. Theorem 3.2 impl ies, 
however, that when the disposition of such benefits enters the 
pol itical arena and becomes subj ect to manipulation by pol itici ans 
seeking el ectoral gain, they wil l be distributed more widely, and 
offered to all voters irrespective of need. The equil ibrium 
al location of benef its is thus not one l ikely to promote social 
equal ity.8 (This tendency may also give some insight into the often­
noted "reciprocity norm" in Congressional publ ic works spending, 
whereby proj ects are al located to all distri cts irrespect ive of 
economic j ustification or partisanship. ) 
Part (3) of Theorem 3.2 states that any equil ibrium p must 
satisfy I: i pi = (�1 )A (or in effect, that the average incumbency 
premium must equal the per capi ta l evel of benefits avail abl e ) . When 
this equality does not hold p is not in equil ibrium, and there will be 
voters or groups who can benefit by changing thei r premiums 
accordingly . Until the equil ibrium is restored, however, the 
el ectoral process wil l be temporarily biased in favor of one or the 
other of the candidates -- the incumbent if I: pi is too l arge, or the 
chall enger if too low (Theorem 1 .4) . Thus , consider the situation in 
which the system is initially in equil ibrium, when the pool of 
benefits is suddenly and exogenously decreased. The pi would then be 
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too high relative to A, In the long rnn voters will eventually adjust 
them downwards and restore equilibrium, but in the interim, before 
this occurs, there will be a series of elections in which '2= pi 
exceeds its equilibrium level, and in these elections the incumbent 
will win, and will earn a positive surplns ( ( 1)  of Theorem 1 .4 ) , It 
thus makes perfect sense for an incumbent to support a balanced-budget 
amendment, or other proposal which imposes an exogenous cap on public 
benefits, since he stands to profit handsomely in the transitional 
period. (The converse is also true, that the challenger would profit 
from an exogenous increase in A; the effect here is weaker, however, 
since after the initial election the victorious challenger becomes the 
incumbent and is thus disadvantaged, and his opponent over time will 
eventually capture a sizeable share of the windfall. )  
An equilibrium is not nnique, and in general there will be 
many p 8 JR n which are potential equilibria. In a two-party electoral 
system, in particular, we might well expect two different equilibria 
to be present, which depend on the identity of the incumbent party. 
Denote the two parties by a and p (unt il now we have distinguished 
between parties or candidates only on the basis of their incumbency 
status ) ,  and by p0 and pp the two corresponding equilibria, Whenever 
party a is incumbent each voter i discounts the challenger' s  bid by p� 1 
(and thus votes for him only if yi > p� +xi ) '  and conversely applies 
the di scount factor p� whenever p i s  incumbent . A voter for whom 
pi
a = p� behaves the same no matter which party is  incumbent . If p� 1 1 
and p: differ, however, i in effect has partisan preferences; in thi s 
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case p� > p� reflects a preference for party a ,  while if pp > p0 i is 
more favorably disposed toward incumbents of the other party, Let us 
rewrite the incumbency premia in a slightly different and more 
convenient form by defining two components, ai = 1/2 [p; - p� ] ,  the 
pure partisanship component, and ni = 1/2 [p; + p� ] ,  the pure 
incumbency component . Then, clearly, p� = ni + ai and p� = ni - ai ' 
so i ' s  premium is the sum of the incumbency effect plus or minus 
(depending on the identity of the incumbent ) the partisan effect. The 
partisan component ai is thus essentially a measure of i's party 
identification, since it reflects his loyalty toward or intrinsic 
preference for a (or p, if ai < 0), 
The concept of party identification has played a major role in 
empirical work on voting and elections . The basic rationalistic 
premise in the theoretical literature, however, has been that voters 
view parties and elections instrumentally, as means toward their 
ultimate ends of attaining better policies or more benefits, and it 
has proven difficult to reconcile (or even incorporate) a notion of 
intrinsic party loyalties into this instrumentalist framework. For 
this reason the concept has played little or no role in the 
theoretical literature. In the present structure, however, there is a 
natural way of def ining long-rnn partisan preferences. We may thus 
inquire into the extent to which such intrinsic loyalties are 
compatible with individual rationality, and more generally into the 
nature of the equilibrium distribution of partisan preferences. 
( 1 )  of Theorem 3 .4 implies that each ai must satisfy 
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-A/m < ai < A/m, so may be either positive or negative, and certainly 
need not be zero. Thus individual partisan preferences for either 
party are perfectly compatible with individual rationality. At the 
aggregate level, however, it follows from ( 2) of Theorem 3.4 that 
I ai "' 1/2 c[ p� - I p� ] "' 1 /2 [ (�1) A  - .m;1> AJ "' 0 
Thus, in equilibrium, the electorate as a whole is not biased in favor 
of either party. A distribution of partisan preferences which favored 
one party would be unstable, and there would be voters or groups who 
stand to gain, in the long run, by weakening their loyalties : over 
time, such adj ustments continue until the electorate reaches a 
partisan balance and a new equilibrium is established. This result 
thus provides a theoretical explanation of the historical tendency, 
noted by Sellers (196 5 )  and others, for two-party systems to return to 
partisan balance over time. 
1 .  Candidate Behayior 
We begin with some preliminary definitions and notation. 
There is a finite set N = (1 , 2 ,  • • •  , n } of� (or groups ) ,  indexed 
by i. The number n of voters is odd, with m = (n+l ) /2 .  A coalition C 
is a subset of N, and #C is the cardinality of, or number of voters 
belonging to, the coalition c. We denote by [ j , k] , ( j , k] ,  [j , k) ,  etc. 
the coalitions {i :i  2. j ,  is k} , { i : i  > j ,  is kl. {i :i  2. j ,  i < k} , 
etc, C is a majority coalition if #C 2. m, and M* "' {C C N: ltC 2. m} is 
the set of such majority coalitions . For any vector z S JR n and 
coalition Cc N, z( C )  denotes the quantity z( C) "' 'f zi. i "e c 
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An allocation by a party is a vector z e JR n which is 
nonnegative, z 2. 0, and which satisfies the budget constraint 
z(N)  i A, where A > 0 is the fixed budget of benefits or services 
available for allocation to voters or for consumption by the political 
parties. There are two political parties (or candidates ) ,  the 
incumbent, party 1 ,  and the challenger, party 2 .  We denote by 
X = {x, x ' ,  • • •  } the possible allocations by the incumbent, and by 
Y"' { y, y' ,  • • •  } the possible allocations by the challenger. 
The incumbency premium for voter i is a real number pi' which 
may be positive or negative (or zero) .  Given the allocations x and y, 
voter i votes for the challenger if y i > xi + pi; otherwise, if 
Yi S xi+ pi' he votes for the incumbent. The n-tuple of incumbency 
premiums is a vector p e JR n. 
Given x, y and p, let C be the set of voters who vote for the 
incumbent : thus C = {i :  xi+ pi 2. yi} .  If C constitutes a maj ority, 
i.e. C S M•, the incumbent wins the election. We then define : 
vi( x, y;p )  = xi' the� to each voter i; s1Cx, y;p )  "'A - x (N) 2. 0, 
the surplus to the incumbent; and s2 ( x, y;p )  = - s1 (x , y;p ) , the surplus 
to the challenger. Otherwise, if C / M*, the challenger wins, and the 
payoffs and surpluses are vi(x , y;p )  = yi for any i, 
s2 ( x, y;p )  "'A - y( N) , and s1 (x , y;p )  "' - s2 (x, y;p ) . 
Each party is assumed to be interested in obtaining as large a 
surplus as possible. Given p and the incumbent's allocation x, let 
A A 
s2Cx; p)  = sup s2 (x, y;p) ,  It would be natural to say an allocation y y@Y 
A A 
is "optimal" for the challenger if s2 (x , y; p) "'s2 (x;p ) . However if 
1 8  
A 
s2 (x; p) > 0, strictly optimal allocation of this kind need not exist: 
for in that case the allocations y yielding a positive surplus 
s2 (x, y;p)  =A - y( N) are those such that yi > xi+ pi' all i E C, for 
some c E M•, so if xi + pi 2 0 ,  attempting to maximize the quantity 
A - y( N) would lead to a corner solution such that yi =xi+ pi' at 
which the challenger would lose i's vote and thus his maj ority ( and 
hence his positive surplus ) .  Rather than use such an allocation, the 
challenger would instead bid slightly more for the voters i e C, 
thereby ensuring a majority and a slightly less-than-optimal, but 
positive, surplus , Thus, for any e > 0 ,  we shall say an allocation y 
A 
is e-optimal for the challenger if s2 (x , y;p )  2 s2 (x;p )  - e, and is 
winning if it is possible for the challenger to win. The e-optimal 
allocations for the challenger are characterized as follows: 
Theorem 1 .1 .  Given p and the incumbent '&  allocation x, define 
x x qi = max(O, xi+pi) ' all i, and w(x )  as the minimum of q (C)  over the 
set of majority coalitions C, i.e.  w(x )  = min qx (C ) . Then: 
C E M• 
( 1 )  If  w (x )  L A the challenger cannot win against x.  His surplus is 
A 
s2 (x;p) = s2 (x, y; p )  -[A - x (N)] ( 0 no matter what allocation y 
he uses, i. e. every y e Y is &-optimal. 
( 2)  
A 
If w(x) < A the challenger can win, and s2 (x;p)  A - w(x)  ) O.  
An allocation y is &-optimal if and only if 
y( N) i w(x)  + e, and yi > xi+ pi all i E C,  for some C E  M•. 
� (1): In order for the challenger to win there must exist an 
allocation y and maj ority coalition C E M• such that y i > x1 + pi, all 
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i e c. Since yi 2 0 ,  this would imply either xi+ pi < 0 = q� ,5. yi or 
x 0 i xi+ pi = qi < yi for each i E C; moreover the latter must hold 
for at least one i E C ( for otherwise we would have O = qx(C)  2 w(x ) ,  
a contradiction of the hypothesis that w(x) 2 A) . Hence 
y(C )  ) qx (C) 2 w(x )  L A. This is impossible, however, for y would 
then violate the budget constraint A 2 y( N) , since clearly 
y( N) L y( C ) ,  Therefore the challenger cannot win, implying 
s2 (x, y; p) = -s1 ( x, y; p)  =-[A - x (N)] for any allocation y E Y, and 
hence that any such allocation is e-optimal for all e ) O .  
A 
(2 )  Let C be  a maj ority coalition which minimizes 
x xA q (C) , i. e. q (C) = w(x) . For sufficiently small e > 0, the 
allocation ye given by 
£ 
Yi 
x qi + ..§. n
..§. 
n 
A 
for i e c 
otherwise 
is winning, and yields a surplus of s2 (x, y
2;p) =A - y6(N) = 
x A A x A A - q (C) - e .  Hence s2 (x;p) LA - q (C) =A - w(x) )0. Since any e-
optimal allocation y must also be winning, it must satisfy yi 2 q�, 
all i E C, for some maj ority coalition C E M•. But then 
y( N) � y( C) L qx (C) L w(x ) ,  implying 
A. 
s2Cx;p )  - e i s2 (x, y;p)  
A 
it follows that s2 (x;p)  
immediately. QED 
A - y( N) i A - w(x) . Hence, letting e � 0, 
A - w(x) , from which the rest of (2 )  follows 
The allocations of interest are those which are e-optimal for 
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small e; thus ( with some abuse of terminology) we define: 
A 
Definition 1.1, An allocation y is optimal for the challenger 
against x if for any sequence sj -7 0 ,  £ j > 0 there exists a sequence 
of allocations yj such that yj -7 � and yj is sj-optimal against x for 
A 
all j , We denote by Y(x;p) the set of allocations which are optimal 
against x, 
In practice, of course, a rational challenger would not use an 
optimal allocation, but would instead choose an e-optimal one. 
However, tho limiting allocations provide a complete characterization 
of the e-optimal allocations (for small e), and we shall henceforth 
confine attention to them, An explicit characterization is as 
follows: 
Theorem 1,2 Given p and x, define q� as in Theorem 1.1, and let voters 
x x be indexed so that qi i qi+l' all i, Then: 
(1) If qx[l,m] L A the challenger loses. His surplus is 
A 
s2(x;p) =-[A - x(N)], and every allocation y is optimal. 
(2) If qx[l,m] < A the challenger can win. His optimal surplus is 
A x A s2(x;p) =A - q [l,m] > O. An allocation y is optimal if and 
only if 
x for i � m A qi y. = 
1 0 otherwise 
for some such indexing of voters. 
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Proof Since q� i q�+l' all i, it follows that [l,m] = {1,2 ,  • • •  , m} 
minimizes qx(C) over C E M•. (1) and all but the "only if" part of (2) 
then follow immediately from Theorem 1.1. To show the rest, note that 
if C minimizes qx(C) over C E M•, then q� i q� , for all i E C, i' ; C, 
( for otherwise substituting i' for i would yield a coalition 
C' = C U{i'} - {i} E M• for which qx(C') < w(x), a contradiction), so 
there exists some indexing such that C = [1,#C], If #C > m, it must 
be true that q� = 0 for all i e (m,#C] (for otherwise 
qx[l,m] < qx(C) = w(x), again a contradiction), which implies the 
result, QED 
Turning now to the other party, we shall say an allocation is 
optimal for the incumbent if it guarantees him as large a surplus as 
A A 
possible: thus, given p, let s1(p) =max inf s1(x,y;p), Then xis xEX yEY 
A A A 
optimal for the incumbent if inf s1(x ,y;p) = s1(p). We denote by X(p) yEY 
the set of such allocations. They are characterized by the following 
series of results: 
Theorem 1.3 Given p, for any allocation x define w(x) a s  in Theorem 
A 
i.i. An allocation x is then optimal for the incWDbent iff either 
( 1) 
A A A 
w(x) LA and x(N) = min x(N), i.e. x is winning, and does 
{x:w(x)lA} 
so at minimum cost, The incumbent's surplus is then 
A 
sl (p) 
A 
A - x(N) L O. 
A A A 
(2) w(x) <A and w(x) =max w(x), i.e. x is losing, but maximizes the 
xEX 
challenger's cost of winning, The incumbent's surplus is then 
A A 
s1 (p) =-[A - w(x)] < O. 
Proof Follows directly from Theorem 1.1 and the fact that the 
incumbent wishes to maximize the quantity 
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A A 
inf sl(x, y;p) =inf [-s2(x, y;p)] =-sup s2(x , y; p) = -s2(x; p) over x ex. y y y 
QED 
We shall say an allocation x is a trivial optimum if every 
x' e x is optimal for the incumbent. Then: 
Lemma 1.1 Let voters be indexed so that pi i pi+l' all i, and define 
.Ri = min(O,pi) ,  all i. The following statements are then equivalent: 
(1) There exists a trivial optimum for the incumbent, or equivalently 
A 
( 2) 
y = 0 is uniquely optimal for the challenger, against any x, 
A A 
The challenger wins with surplus s2(p) =A= -s1(p), against any 
x. 
(3) .R[m, n] i -A, or equivalently ,R(C) i A for every C E M*. 
� (3) =} (2): Let r be the largest integer such that 
pi < 0 for all i i r. Suppose ,R[m, n] i -A. Then clearly r 2. m, and 
,R[m, n] = p[m, r], For any allocation x, let 
J+ ={ii r: p. + x. > O} . If #J
+ > (r - m+ 1) =#[m, r], then 1 1 -
evidently p(J+) i p[m, r] from the indexing and the fact that p, < 0 
1 
for i i r. Hence qx(J+) (x + p) (J+) = 
x (J+) + p(J+) i A +  p[m, r] i A - A= 0 ,  since x(J+) i x(N) i A and 
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p[m, r] = ,R[m, n] i -A, This is a contradiction, however, since q� > O 
for an i E J+, Hence it must be that #J+ i r - m, and hence that 
# {i i r: xi + 
+ pi i O} = r - #J 2. m. Thus there exists a coalition 
C, #C = m, such that xi + pi i 0 for all i E C, so for any e > 0 the 
allocation 
1 Yi 
£ 
0 
for i e c 
otherwise 
would win for the challenger and yield a surplus of 
s2(x, y
1;p) =A - mt. Since s2(x, y;p) i A for any x, y, it follows 
1 that A 2. sup s2(x, y;p) 2. s2(x, y ;p) =A - ms, so letting e � 0 we y 
A 
have s2 (x; p) sup s2(s , y; p) =A. Since this holds for all x S X it y 
A A 
follows that s1(x) =max - s2(s ; p) =-A. x 
(2) =} (1): Clearly s2(x, y;p) i A for any x, y, so for any x' S X, it 
A 
must be true that s1(p) 
-sup Cs2(x' , y; p)] 2. -A. y 
A A 
=max [-s2(x; p)] 2. -s2(x';p) = x 
A A 
Hence s1(p) =-A implies -s2(x';p) = -A, for 
all x' e X, i, e. that every such allocation is a trivial optimum for 
the incumbent, 
(1) =} (3): Suppose a trivial optimum exists but, contrary to (3), 
A A 
that ,R[m, n] >-A. A trivial optimum exists iff s2(x;p) = -s1(p) for 
A 
all x ex. This could not be true if s1(p) 2. o, for then the 
incumbent would always win (with any x), so his surplus would be 
s1(x, y; p) =A - x(N) , which clearly depends on the choice of x. Hence 
A A 
the incumbent must lose , and 0 )  s1(p) = -s2(x;p) for all x. As 
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before, let r be the largest integer such that pi < 0 for all i � r. 
If r � m then under any allocation of the form xi = & 2 0 ,  all i 2 r, 
A x [1, m] would be a least-cost coalition, so s2(x;p) =A - q [1, m] = 
A - p[r, m] - (m - r + 1)&, which clearly depends on the c hoice of & ,  a 
contradiction; hence r > m. Now consider the vector x defined by 
0 for i < m 
xi -pi + & for i E [m, r] 
& for i > r 
If & 2 0 clearly xi 2 0 for all i. Since p[m, r] = .l![m, n] and 
J![m, n] > -A by hypothesis, evidently 
x(N) = 0 + (& - p)[m, r] + &(r,n] = 
-p[m, r] + m& = -.l![m, n] + m& <A + m&. Hence for sufficiently small 
& > 0 ,  x will be a feasible allocation. Evidently [1, m] will still be 
a least-cost coalition for the challenger, and 
qx[l, m] = qx[l, m) + � = 0 + &. Hence his surplus is 
A x s2(x;p) =A - q [1, m] =A - 6, which, again, depends on 6, a 
contradiction which proves the result. QED 
N ext, we have: 
Lemma 1.2 Let voters be indexed so that pi � pi+l' all i, and define 
pi= max (0 , pi) ,  all i. The following statements are then equivalent: 
(1) 
( 2) 
y. 
A 
x = 0 is uniquely optimal for the incumbent. 
A 
The incumbent wins with surplus s1(p) 
A 
A= -s2(p), against any 
(3) p[l, m] L A, or equivalently p(C) L A for all C E M*. 
A 
� (3) 9 (2): If (3) holds then the allocation x = 0 satisfies 
A A 
x - - x qi= Pi � Pi+l = qi+l ' all i. Hence [1, m] is a least-cost coalition 
A 
x -and its cost to the challenger is q [1, m] = p[l, m] LA, from (3). 
A 
Hence f rom Theorem 1.1 the incumbent wins with x, and his surplus is 
A A 
s1(p) =A - x(N) =A. 
(2) 9 (1): If (2) holds then any optimal allocation x must satisfy 
A A 
A= s2(p) =A - x(N), implying x(N) = 0 ,  and hence that x = O is the 
unique optimal allocation. 
A 
(1) 9 (3): Suppose x = O is nontrivially optimal. Evidently 
A 
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x qi = max(O, O+pi) pi for all i, and [1, m] is a least-cost coalition 
for the challenger. If the challenger won then pm � 0 would imply 
x A x pi � 0 ,  whence qi = 0 ,  all i i m, whence s2(p) = A - q [1, m] = A, and 
A 
hence (from (2) of Lemma 1.1) that x is a trivial optimum, a 
contradiction of the initial hypothesis. The remaining possibility is 
pm < o. In that case, under the allocation xi' = & > 0 ,  all i, [1, m] 
A A • 
is stiii a ieast-cost coaiition, and qx [1, m] L qx[i,m] + 6 ) qx[l, m], 
A x' � A A so s2(x ', p) =A - q [1, m] <A - q [1, m] = s2(x;p), so x would not be 
optimal, again a contradiction. Thus the challenger cannot win 
A 
against x, so (1) of Theorem 1.1 must hold, implying 
A 
x -A �  q [1, m] = p[l, m], i.e. that (3) above holds. QED 
The interesting case is when x I 0 is a nontrivial optimum. 
As an immediate consequence of Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2, we note: 
Comment 1.1 Let voters be indexed so that pi � pi+l' all i, and 
define .l!i and p i as in Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2. The following statements 
are then equivalent: 
A 
(1) There exists a nontrivial optimum x I 0 for the incumbent. 
A A 
(2) -A < s1(p ) <A and -A < s2(p ) <A. 
(3) p[l,m] < A and .l![m,n] ) -A. 
N ext, we note 
A 
Lemma 1.3 Suppose there exists a nontrivial optimum x I 0 for the 
incumbent, and let w(x) be defined as in Theorem 1.1. Then either 
(1) 
(2) 
A A 
w(x) = A and x(N) = min x(N) i A , in which case the 
{x: w(x)2A} 
A 
incumbent wins and A >  s1(p) 2 0, or 
A A 
w(x) = max w(x) ( A and x(N) = A, in which case the challenger 
x 
A 
can win and A ) s2Cp ) > O. 
A 
Proof (1): If (1) of Theorem 1.3 holds and w(x) ) A then an 
allocation 
A A 
xi 
- & if xi ) 0 
x ' = "" i xi otherwise 
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A 
would satisfy x'(C) 2 x(C) - ne for any C 6 M•, so for sufficiently 
small & ) 0, w(x') 2 A, i. e. x' would also be winning. But since 
A A 
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x I 0, x'(N) < x(N) so x' would increase the incumbent's surplus, i,e, 
A 
x would not be optimal, 
(2) If (2) of Theorem 1,3 holds but x(N) <A then there exists an 
"" 
allocation xi' =xi + & for some a ) O. From Comment 1.1 
A A A A 
A >  s2(p ) =A - w(x), whence 0 < w(x) i q
x(C) for any C 6 M•. But for 
A 
x' x x A any such C, q (C) ) q (C) (since 0 < qi = xi + Pi < 
A A 
for at least one i e C), so w(x') > w(x) and x would 
again, Hence x(N) = A. QED 
x' x'i + pi =qi 
not be optimal, 
The following provides a more explicit, though partial, 
characterization of the nontrivially optimal allocations: 
A 
Lemma 1.4 Suppose x I 0 is a nontrivial optimum for the incumbent. 
A A A A 
Let voters be indexed so that q� i q�+l' and pi � Pi+l if 
x x qi = qx+l' 
A 
for all i, and let l be the smallest integer for which 
the largest for which xi > O. Then: 
(1) 1 i l i r � n and l i m 
(2) Pi � Pi+l for all i 2 r and i ( ( 
"" 
"" 
(3 ) xi > 0 implies q� > 0 for all i 
A 
x qi ) 0 and r 
(4) If r > m then i < l implies pi < 0, and x is of the form 
A 
xi 
a - Pi > 0 
0 
for i e [f. r] 
otherwise 
where a > O. (In this case pi i pi+l for all i). 
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A 
� (3 ): A x Suppose (3) did not hold, i.e. that xi• < 0, qi• = 0 for 
some i•. By the reasoning used in proving Lemm a 1.3 ,  if the 
A 
incumbent wins, then the allocation xi' = 0 for i = i•, =xi otherwise 
would also win, yet would increase the incumbent's surplus. 
I 
Alternatively, if the incumbent lost then the allocation xi = 0 for i 
A x . • 
= i•, =xi + n � 1 otherwise would decrease the challenger's surplus. 
A 
Bence x would not be optimal, a contradiction. 
A 
(1): x I 0 implies 1 i r i n, and with (3 ) above implies 1 i f  i r. 
A 
If l > m then q1[1,m] = 0 
A 
so s2(p ) =A, which from Lemma 1.1 would 
A 
contradict the hypothesis that x is nontrivially optimal. Hence 
t i m. 
(2): From the indexing and definition of r, clearly 
A A A 
x x x Pr i qr i qi = Pi i qi+l = Pi+l for i > r, so Pi+l 2 pi for i 2 r. 
A 
Similarly i < I implies q� = max(O,pi) = 0 ,  so from the indexing 
pi i Pi+l for i < I - 1. 
To extend this to i < f, suppose the contrary, i. e. 
A A 
. x x A 
P(-l > Pt• Since Pt < p (-l i q!-l = 0 < q! = pt + x1, it follows that 
A 
Pt < 0 and x1 > o. If the incumbent wins then the allocation 
A 
x! - (pt-1 - pt) for i = l - 1 
x' = i 0 for i = l 
A 
xi otherwise 
A A 
x' would satisfy qi 
x x' = qi for i I l. l - 1, q! 
x = 0 = q!-1' 
A A 
x' x x 0 < q!-l = q! i qi for i 2 t, so since t i m, [1,m] would still be a 
least-cost coalition for the challenger, and its cost would still be 
A 
x' x q [1,m] = q [1,m], However x'(N) = x'(N - {f-1,l)) 
A A A 
x(N - {t-1,!} )  + x1 - (pt-l - pt) + 0 = x(N) - (pt-l 
A 
+ X' + I 
l-1 x l 
A 
- Pt) < x(N) 
(since x1_1 = 0, from (3) above), so x' would still w1n and would 
29 
increase the incumbent's surplus, a contradiction. Alternatively, if 
A 
the challenger could win against x, then the allocation 
0 for i < t - 1 
A 
x! - (pt-1 - pt) +
 6 for i = l - 1 
x' = i 0 for i = l 
A 
xi + 
£ 
for i > I 
(p(-1 - pt) where e = (n _ l + l) > 0, would decrease his surplus, again a 
A 
contradiction of the hypothesis that x is optimal. 
A A A A 
(4): x x Suppose qr > q!. 
A x x Let T = {i: xi > 0 and qi= qr } ,  t 
consider an allocation of the form 
x' i 
A 
x1 - a 
A 
xi = 0 for i t T UUJ 
for i S T 
#T, and 
for some small & > O. 
For sufficiently small 
A 
If the incumbent wins let x't = xt + (t - l)e. 
e, [l,m] would still be a least-cost coalition 
and x' x q [ 1, m] - q [ 1, m] 
A A 
= (x' - x)(T n [1,m]) + x't - x! = 
-a # (T n [l, m]) + Ct - l) s L 0 (since re T by definition, and r > m 
by assumption, implying # (T 0 [1, m]) it - 1 ) . But since 
A 
x'( N) - x[N] =-Et+ (t  - l) a =-a < 0, x' would increase the 
incumbent's surplus, which is impossible. Similarly, if the 
3 0  
challenger wins, setting x't =ta would decrease his surplus, again a 
A A 
contradiction. X X Hence it cannot be that qr > ql' which from the 
A A A 
X X X indexing implies that qr= ql =qi all i E [f, r].  
A 
X A 
a • ql > 0 it follows that x is of the stated form. 
Hence, taking 
Moreover if pi• L 0 for some i• < ( , we could construct an 
allocation x• (where x•i• ( r  -
l + l ) e  if the challenger wins or 
A 
( r  - {)s if the incumbent does, x•i = xi - e for i e [f , r], x•i = 0 
otherwise) which increase the incumbent's surplus, by the same 
reasoning as above. QED 
A 
Rather than attempt a complete characterization of X(p) for 
all possible p, we shall confine attention to incumbency premiums 
which are in equilibrium, or nearly so (in a sense which is defined 
precisely in the section below) . Optimal candidate strategies for 
these p are given by the following important result : 
Theorem 1 .4 • Let a =  min (A/m, ( l/n )[A + p ( N)]) . If 
lpi l i a ( ( a, respectively) is optimal (uniquely optimal , 
respectively) for the incumbent . The election outcome and surplus to 
the winning candidate is then as follows: 
(1 )  m-1 If p (N) L -;;;-A then a A/mi ( l/n )[A + p (N) ]  and the incumbent 
A A 
wins, with surplus s1 (p)  =[A - x( N)] 
3 1 
[p (N) - ( .!!!::! ) A] ·L 0 m 
(2 )  m-1 If p (N) < -;;;-A then a ( l/n ) [A + p (N)] < A/m and the challenger 
wins, with surplus 
A A m nrl s2Cx; p)  = [A - a • m] =-;;: C C-;-> A - p ( N)] ) O .  
h2.2f Note that A/mi ( l/nHA + p(N) )] iff nA �A+ p (N) m iff 
m - 1 �-m� A� p ( N) ,  (since n - m = m - 1 ) , and conversely. Let voters be 
indexed and l and r defined as in Lemma 1 .4 .  
( 1 ) : If a = Alm then x (N) = ( A/m -p) ( N) nA =- -m p (N) � A (by the 
A 
second inequality above) ,  so x is a feasible allocation. For any 
A 
C E M•, qx(C )  = CA/m) #C 2. CA/m) m = A since #C 2. m, so the incumbent 
A nA wins, and his surplus is A - x ( N) = A - -;;;- + p ( N) 
m - 1 p ( N) - -m- A 2. O .  
Now consider some optimal allocation x', and let voters be 
indexed and l and r defined as in Lemma 1 .4 ,  with respect to this 
allocation. x' The incumbent must still win, so q (C )  L A for any 
x' I C E M•. If r i m this would imply qi = pi i A m for all i > r, 
hence (from the indexing) that q�' � A/m for all i. If this - -i - . 
and 
x' inequality were strict for any i, however, then q ( C )  < A for any 
coalition C which contains i and #C = m, so the incumbent would lose, 
which is impossible. 
A 
x' A Hence qi = A/m, all i, implying x = x' and 
hence that x is uniquely optimal. 
The remaining possibility is that r > m. In this case, from 
( 4) of Lemma 1 .4 ,  there exists a >  0 such that X ' i = a - pi > 0 for 
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i e [(,r]. xi' = 0 >pi for i < '· while pi 2 a and xi' = 0 for i > r .  
x' Clearly the incumbent must win with x'. so q [1 , m] LA, implying 
x' x' x' m(A/m) =A i q [l,m] = q [1,{] + q [f,m] = 0 + a ( m  - l + 1 ) ,  Hence 
A A 
a L A/m. F.quality would imply l 1 ,  in which case x = x' so x is 
uniquely optimal. Otherwise, suppose a > A/m and ( > 1 .  Then r = n 
(since pi i A/m < a  for all i) , and we can rewrite the above 
inequality as ( f  - l) (A/m) i ( a  - A/m) ( m  - l + 1)  = 
1 /2[2 ( a  - A/m) (m - l + 1)]  = 1 /2Ca - A/m) ([n - l + 1] - [f - 2]) i 
1/2Ca - A/m) (n - l + 1)  (using the facts that 2m = n + 1 and l L 2) . 
A A 
x' must yield at least as large a surplus as x, so x'(N) i x(N) , i. e. 
x'(N) = x'[l,{) + '[f,n] = 
A A A A A 
0 + ( x' - x) [f,n] + x[f,n] i x(N) = x[l,{) + x[f,n], implying 
A A 
( x' - x ) [f,n] =(a - A/m) (n - l + 1 )  i x[l,{) = 
(A/m - p )[l,{) i 2(A/m) ( f  - 1 ) ,  since pi 2 -A/m, all i. Clearly this 
and the earlier inequalities will be consistent only if all are 
A A 
actually equalities, implying x ( N) = x(N) and hence that x is also 
optimal. Moreover if pi > -A/m for all i the above inequality would 
be strict, a contradiction of the earlier inequality, so the 
A A 
hypothesis a > A/m, l > 1 cannot hold, i.e.  x' = x and x is the unique 
optimal allocation for the incumbent. 
A 
( 2) :  I f  a= (1/n )[A + p ( N)]  < A/m then x( N) = ( l/n[A + p ( N) - p](N) 
A+ p ( N) - p ( N) = A, so the allocation is feasible, again. For any 
A 
C, #C = m, evidently qx ( C )  = O/n[A + p ( N)] ) m  < CA/m) n1 = A so the 
challenger can win, and his optimal surplus is 
A 
x I m -1 I A - q ( C )  = nA n - m/n[A + p(N)] = -- A - ( m  n )p (N)  n 
I m - 1 
A 
m n [-- A - p(N)] > O. The optimality and uniqueness of x are DI 
argued as above. QED 
2 . �  
An l.!,!YJ! is a proposal or measure which, if enacted, would 
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result in a specific distribution of gains or losses to voters, i. e. a 
fixed vector b e JR n of net benefits. Each party must adopt a 
position on the issue, i.e.  favor or oppose it. If a party favors it 
and then wins the election using an allocation z, each voter i 
subsequently receives a benefit of zi + bi; alternatively, if the 
winning party opposes the issue, the subsequent benefit to i is only 
zi. The incumbent must commit himself to a position and an allocation 
before the challenger does . Voters use the same decision rule as 
before, except that then they now include the benefits arising from 
the candidates' issue positions in their calculations (e.g .  if the 
incumbent opposes the issue and the challenger favors it, i votes for 
the incumbent if and only if xi+ pi l yi +bi, and so forth) . 
A strategy for a party consists of a position and an 
allocation, e.g.  ( favor, x) . Optimal strategies are defined in the 
obvious way. we shall say a position (or allocation ) is optimai for a 
party if there is an optimal strategy involving that position (or 
allocation) ;  if all optimal strategies involve that position (or 
allocation ) ,  it is uniquely optimal, A position is conditionally 
optimal with respect to an arbitrary (not necessarily optimal) 
allocation if it maximizes the party's surplus (minimum surplus, for 
an incumbent ) over the set of strategies containing that allocation; 
an allocation conditionally optimal with respect to a position is 
similarly defined, (Clearly a strategy (n, z) is optimal if and only 
if n and z are conditionally optimal with respect to z and n, 
A 
3 4  
respectively. )  We  denote by  sj(b, p) the optimal surplus for candidate 
A 
j ,  given p and the issue b, and by s2(x, n; b ,p )  the challenger' s 
optimal surplus against the strategy (x, n) . 
If both candidates adopt the same position on an issue, the 
outcome and surpluses will depend only on their allocations, Thus the 
challenger can always guarantee himself at least �2(p ) by matching the 
incumbent's position and using the optimal allocation of Theorem 1 .1;  
hence 
A A A A 
Comment 2 .1 . For any issue b, s1Cb, p )  i s1(p ) and s2Cb, p )  l s2(p );  
no  issue can help the incumbent, 
Issues can be classified in various ways, For example an 
issue is a weak Pareto-improyement over the status quo if bi ) O, all 
i (or conversely is Pareto-inferior if bi < 0 ,  all i) ; socially 
beneficial (or disadvantageous, respectively) if b(N) > 0 (b(N) < 0 ,  
respectively) ; or  is  majority preferred if there is some maj ority 
coalition C E M• for which bi > O, all i E C. Strategically, however, 
the following classification turns out to be the fundamental one : 
Definition 2 .1 ,  Given an issue b, let voters be indexed so that 
bi i bi+l' all i, Then the issue is 
(1) positive if b [l , m] l 0 ,  or equivalently  b(C ) l 0, all 
C 6 M• , 
(2) negative if b [m, n ]  i 0 ,  or equivalently b(C) i 0 ,  all 
C 6 M•; or 
(3 ) controversial if it is neither positive or negative, i, e, 
b [1 , m] < O and b [m, n ]  ) O. 
If the inequalities in (1) or (2) are strict, the issue is strictly 
positive or negative, respectively, 
In analyzing the electoral impact of such issues, we shall 
3 5  
confine attention to  situations in which p is near equilibrium, and in 
which the distribution of benefits and costs generated by the issue 
itself is small relative to the allocated benefits, In particular, we 
shall henceforth assume the issue b to be "small" in the following 
sense: 
Definition 2 ,2 Given p and b, let voters be indexed so that 
bi i bi+l' all i, and define a =  min CA/m, (1/n ) [A + p(N)] ) ,  The 
issue b is "small" (relative to p)  if lpi ± (bn - b1 > 1  < a  for all i. 
We now have: 
Theorem 2 .1 , Let b be a positive issue which is "small. " It is 
optimal for both candidates to favor it; uniquely so for the 
incumbent, if the issue is strictly positive, and for the challenger 
as well if he can win, The outcome and surplus to the winning 
A A 
candidate are unaffected, i.e. sj(b, p )  = sj(p ) for either candidate j ,  
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( Analogous results for a negative issue b are obtained by applying the 
assertions above to a new issue b* = -b . )  
� Let xi = a - pi' where as usual a =  min[A/m, l/n A +  p ( N) ] , It 
follows from Definition 2 .3 that a > 0, and xi > 0, all i. Let voters 
be indexed so that b1 i b2 i . . • i bm' 
Suppose first that the incumbent favors the issue, and uses 
the allocation x. If the challenger opposed the issue, he would have 
to bid qi' =max ( 0, a +  bi) for i ' s  vote, so C' 
least-cost coalition for him, and its cost will be 
[1,m] will be a 
q ' ( C ' ) l ( a + b) (C ' ) =am + b (C ' )  l am (since b (C ' ) l 0 for a positive 
issue ) , If instead he favored the issue he would have to bid only a 
for any vote, so the cost of C' would be am; hence, given this 
strategy by the incumbent, it is optimal for the challenger to favor 
the issue, uniquely so if the issue is strictly positive and the 
challenger can win ( if not any position would be optimal for him) , 
Now suppose the incumbent opposed the issue , If the 
challenger favors it, he would have bid q� =max ( 0, a - bi) for i' s 
vote, so c2 = [m,n] is a least-cost coalition, and its cost is 
q2 CC2 ) =max ( 0, a - b ) (C2 ; < am (since bi > 0 for all i e [m,n] 
for a positive issue ) . On the other hand if the challenger also 
opposed the issue he would have to bid a for any voter i ' s  vote, so 
the ost of securing a maj ority would be am; hence it is optimal 
(uniquely so, if the challenger can win ) for him to favor it, 
Moreover since the minimum cost to the challenger would be less in 
,:}, 
l- ' 
this case, it is uniquely optimal (conditional on x) for the incumbent 
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to favor the issue, 
It remains to show that x is optimal, But if the incumbent 
favors the issue and uses x, then since the challenger will also favor 
it, the issue will play no role, and the outcome and surpluses will be 
A 
as given in Theorem 1 .4 (x is identical to the allocation x of Theorem 
1 .4 ) . Hence, in view of Comment 2 .1 ,  the strategy ( favor, x) is 
optimal for the incumbent , 
To establish uniqueness, if the incumbent used an allocation 
x '  I x, then whatever his position n, the challenger could adopt the 
A A 
same position and then obtain a surplus of s2 ( x ' ; p) > s2 (x;p)  
A 
s2 Cx; n;b,p) ,  from the uniqueness part of Theorem 1 .4;  hence x is 
uniquely optimal for the incumbent, from which it follows that it is 
also uniquely optimal for him to favor the issue, QED 
Hence positive issues will be supported and negative ones 
opposed by both candidates, and such issues will not affect the nature 
of the allocational contest between the candidates. 
Controversial issues are another matter, To get some insight 
into the impact of such issues, it will be useful to first consider 
the simpler situation in which the issue arises after the incumbent 
has already committed himself to an allocation (but before the 
challenger has ) . The incumbent, not anticipating the emergence of the 
A 
issue, would then employ the allocation x of Theorem 1 ,4 ;  
subsequently, when the issue arises, he can take whatever position is 
A 
best for him, but cannot readj ust his allocation x. The challenger, 
on the other hand, can decide upon his own position and allocation 
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simultaneously, with full knowledge of his opponent's strategy .  
Let voters be indexed s o  that bi i bi+l' all i ,  and define 
B- = b[l,m] and B+ = b[m,n] as the SllDI of benefits over the least- ana 
most-favored maj ority coalitions, respectively; since the issue is 
- + controversial, B < 0 < B • We then have: 
Comment 2 .2 Let b be a controversial issue which is "small," and 
A 
suppose the incumbent uses the allocation x of Theorem 1 .4 .  No matter 
what position the incllDlbent takes, it is uniquely optimal for the 
challenger to take the opposite position. It is conditionally optimal 
for the inc1JD1bent to favor the issue if B+ 2 IB- 1 (uniquely so, if the 
inequality is strict ) . In this case the challenger can win w ith 
surplus 
A IB- 1 if sl (p ) 2 0 A (� favor;b,p) =A (p ) + IB- 1  52 • s2 otherwise 
(Analogous results for the case B+ i IB- 1  are obtained by applying the 
above assertions to the issue b' = -b . )  
£!22.f Let voters be indexed so that b .  � b . . •  , all i.  1 - 1T.1. If both 
candidates take the same position, the challenger must bid a for any 
voter's vote, or am to obtain a maj ority. If the incumbent favored 
and challenger opposed the issue the challenger must bid 
max (0, a + bi ) for i ' s  vote, so [1,m] is a least-cost coa1 ition . 
Since the issue is controversial, bi < bn - b1 , and since it is small, 
l b  - b1 1 < a. Bence a + b .  > 0 and the cost of the coalition is n 1 
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(a + b)[l,m] = a" m + B- < a"m (since B- < 0) so it is optimal for the 
challenger to oppose it. By the same reasoning, if the incumbent 
opposed and the challenger favored the issue, the challenger would 
have to bid a - bi for i's vote, [m,n] would be a least-cost 
coalition, and its cost would be (a - b )[m,n] = a" m - B+ > a " m. 
Bence, again, it is optimal for the challenger to take the opposite 
position (un iquely so, if he can win) . It is conditionally optimal 
for the incumbent to take whichever position is most costly for the 
challenger, i, e. to favor the issue if IB- 1 i -B
+ or to oppose it if 
the inequality is reversed . 
In the former case, the cost to the challenger of securing a 
maj ority is IB- 1 less than it would have been in the absence of the 
issue, i . e. in the pure allocation game of Theorem 1 ,4 .  If a =  A/m 
the inc1JD1bent would have won originally, so now the challenger does, 
with surplus 'Z2(b,p ) = IB- 1 ;  otherwise, if a =  1/n [A + p(N)] 
A A 
challenger wins in both cases, with surplus s2(b,p) = s1 ( p )  + 
QED 
the 
I B- 1 . 
If the inc1JD1bent opposes the issue the challenger, by favoring 
it. can obtain the votes of those who would benefit from it more 
cheaply than otherwise, while if the incumbent favors it those who 
bear its costs become more vulnerable to the challenger. Bence 
irrespective of what stand the incumbent takes on it, a controversial 
issue creates opportunities for the challenger. The incumbent 
minimizes this vulnerability by favoring the issue if B+ 2 I B- 1 , or 
+ -equivalently 0 i B + B = b[m,n] + b[l,m] = b[l,n] + bm b (N) + bm; 
thus 
if the benefit bm to the median voter is negligibly small, the 
incumbent favors a controversial issue if it is socially beneficial, 
and opposes it if not . The challenger, however, takes the opposite 
position, and prevails. Thus the socially inoptimal position is  
A 
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ultimately victorious .  All this is conditional on x, and assumes the 
incumbent cannot readj ust his allocation to compensate for the 
vulnerabilities created by his stand on the issue, 
To analyze the more general case when the incumbent can 
optimize over his allocation and position simultaneously, we must 
first define some additional quantities. As before, let voters be 
indexed so thst bi � bi+l' all i, and again define B
- e b [l, m] and 
B+ e b [m, n] .  For any number h, define I+(h) e {i 2 m : b .  ) h} , 1 
I-(h) e {i � m : b .  > h} , and f(h) a b(I+(h) ) - b(I-(h) ) .  Evidently 
1 
+ - -f(h) = 0 - 0 = 0 for h 2 bn ' f(h) = B - B ) -B > 0 for h � b1 , and 
i s  continuous and strictly decreasing in h for h S [b1 , bn ] .  Hence 
there exist s  a unique h* e Cb1 , bn ) such that f(h*) = -B
- . We now 
+ + - -define: I e I (h• ) ,  I e I (h* ) ,  
bi - h* for i S I
- U l 
gi E 0 otherwise 
p+ E g(I+) ,  p- E g(I-) .  (Note that f(h*) 
-p l 0, and g(N) ) 0 , )  
+ - - + p - p = -B , p > 0, 
Lemma 2 .1 Let b be a controversial issue, and let voters be indexed 
- + - + and the quantities h*, p , p , B , B , g defined as above. The 
following statement s are then equivalent : 
(1) p > 0 .  
( 2) 
( 3 )  
(4) 
h* < b • m 
h (b . - b )  < -B- . 
1 m m 
b > ...l!..!.NL • m m - 1 
-
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-Proof (1) =} (2) : Since p = g(I-) = (b - h*) (I-) ,  p > 0 implies 
I I 0 and hence that bi > h* for some i S I
-
c [l, m] , whence from the 
indexing bm 2 bi > h*, 
(2) =} (3 ) :  h* < b implies I+ = [ m, n] and m S I-, whence m 
p = g(I-) L b - h* ) 0 and m 
+ + - - -g(I ) = p = -B + p > -B • 
hm (b . - b ) 1 m ) hm (b . - h• ) = 1 
( 3 )  =} (1) :  - + I f  we set h = bm evidently I (h) = 0 ,  I (h) = [ m,n ]  and 
f(h) = hm [bi - bm] '  so if ( 3 )  holds f(h) ) -B-, which implies 
h* < b ,  whence I- F 0, whence P- = (b - h* )(I-) l b  - h• ) O .  m m 
( 3 )  <9 (4) : Evidently 
that 
h (b . - b ) + B-1 m m b [m, n ]  - mbm + b[l,m] = b(N) - (m - l)bm' so ( 3 )  
holds iff b ) ...l!..!.NL m m - l ' QED 
Next, we have: 
Lemma 2 .2 Let b be a controversial issue which is " small, " with 
voters indexed and p+, g, etc. as defined in Lemma 2 .1 .  Define : 
A + xi a a - pi - si' all i, where a a min ((1/m) [A + p ] ,  
A 
1 /n[A + p(N) + g(N) ] ) .  Then x is a feasible allocation for the 
A A A 
incumbent,  and xi > 0, xi + pi ) 0 and xi + pi + bi > 0 for all i. 
� Since a �  (1/n ) [A + p(N) + g(N) ] it follows that 
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x(N) = (a - p - g ) (N) = a  • n - p(N) - g(N) � n(l/n )[A + p(N) + s(N) J 
- p(N) - g(N) = A, so the budget constraint is satisfied . Moreover 
since P+ > 0 and s(N) > 0 it follows that a =  min ((1/m) [A + p+] ,  
(1/n l [A + p(N) + g(N) ] )  > min (A/m, (1/n l[A + p(N) ] )  = a  > 0, while 
Si < bn - bi by construction. Since the issue is small, 
A 
pi + (bn - bl) < a, whence xi = a - pi - si > a - pi - (bn - b1l > 0 ,  
A 
Similarly b small implies (bn - b1l < a, whence xi + pi = a - gi > 
a - (b n - bl) > o .  
A 
xi + pi + bi = 
It is readily verified that 
a +  h• 
a +  bi 
+ -for i 6 I U I 
otherwise 
For a controversial issue lb . I < (b - b1 ) ,  and (b - b1) < a since 1 n n 
the issue is small, so -b . � l bi l < a < a whence a +  b .  1 1 
reasoning applies to h• . QED 
A 
0 . The same 
Lemma 2 .3 Let b and x be as in Lemma 2 .2 .  If the incumbent favors 
A 
the issue and uses the allocation x, either position will be optimal 
for the challenger, If the challenger uses an optimal strategy, the 
outcome and surplus to the incumbent will be as follows :  
The incumbent wins if and only if 
l(a, b)  p ( N) - (.!!!__::...!)A 2 m 
-[B- - JL] m 
+ - B -[B + (- - b ) ]  m m 
In this case his snrplus is 
if b < ..JU1il_ m - m _ l '  or 
if b > ..JU1il_ m m - 1 '  
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m - 1 - B r(N) - (--)A  + [B - -] m m if b � ....l!J.fil.. m m - 1 A A 
2(a,b )  s1 (1 , x) = 
Otherwise, 
m - 1 - B+ p(N) - (--)A + [B + (- - b ) ] m m m 
if he loses, his surplus is 
m m - 1 m - B 
if b > .JU& . m m - 1 
A A 
3(a ,b )  s1(1 , x) 
<;lp(N) - (-n-)A + ;CB - -;-1 
+ 
(m)p(N) - (m - 1 lA  + m[B- + (JL - b ) ]  
if b � ....l!Jfil.. m m - 1 
if b > ....l!Jfil.. n n n m m m m - 1 
Proof If the challenger also favors the issue, he must bid a strictly 
A 
positive (by Lemma 2 .2 )  amount qi E xi+ pi = a - gi for voter i 's  - + vote. If i 6 I U I then gi = bi - h• � bi+l - h* = li+l from the 
indexing, so [m, n]  is a least-cost coalition to the chal l enger, and 
its cost is q[m, n]  = am  - g[m, n ]  = am  - p+, 
Alternatively, if the challenger opposes the issue, he must 
A 
bid 0 < qi' • xi + pi+ bi = a  - gi + bi for i 's  vote, where 
qi' 
a - (bi - h*) + bi 
a + bi 
a + h• for i 6 I- U I+ 
otherwise 
- + Since h• L bi 2 bi-l for all i E I U I , it follows that [1, m] is a 
least-cost coalition , Its cost to the challenger is q ' [l , m] = 
- - + ( a  - g + b )[l , m] = am  - g[l , m] + b[l , m] = am  - p + B = am - p , 
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since Jl+ - Jl -B- by construction. Hence either strategy is 
optimal. 
To prove the remainder, note that if a = l/m[A + Jl+] the cost 
to the challenger is q[m,n] = am  - Jl+ = m(l/m) [A + Jl+] - Jl+ = A; thus 
the incumbent wins if and only if l/m[A + Jl+] i l/n[A + p(N) + g(N) J .  
.JU& Consider first the case b i 1 • Then, from Lemma 2 .1 ,  m m -
+ -Jl = 0 ,  so g(N) = Jl = -B , and the incumbent wins iff 
l/m[A - B-] i l/n[A + p(N) - B-] ,  or (n - m) A - mp(N) i (n - m) B-
which since n - m = m - 1 is equivalent to (la) . If this inequality 
A A A 
holds and the incumbent wins, his surplus is s1(1,r) = A  - r(N) 
A - [an - p(N) - q(N) ] = A  - n(l/m[A + Jl+] )  + p(N) + Jl+ = 
p(N) - (m - 1 ) A  - (.!!!.....::....) (-B-) ,  which is equivalent to (2a) . m m 
Alternatively, if the inequality fails then the incumbent loses, 
I 
A A + a =  1 n[A + p(N) + g(N) ] ,  and s1(1,r) = -(A - q[m,n] )  = -A+ am - Jl 
-A+ m(l/n[A + p(N) + g(N) ] )  - Jl+ 
m - n  m m - n  + m m - 1 m - 1  -= (--) A+ -p(N) + (-- ) p = -p(N) - (--) A+ (�) B  , n n n n n n 
implying (3 a) . 
.JU& -Now consider the case b > 1 •  From Lemma 2 .1 ,  Jl > 0 ,  m m -
+ + -whence I = [m,n]  and g(N) = (b - h* )(I U I ) = 
(b - h*) (I+) + (b - h*)(I-) - (b - h*)(I+ n I-) = Jl+ + Jl - (bm - h* ) ,  
since I+ n I- {m) . As before, the incumbent wins iff 
(l/m)[A + p+ ] i (1/n )[A + p(N) + g(N) ] 
(l/n )[A + p(N) + Jl+ + Jl- - (b - h* ) ] ,  or equivalently, after some m 
manipulation, p(N) - (.!!!.....::.... ) A  2 (.!!!....::....l ) Jl+ - Jl-+ (b - h* ) m m m 
+ - .JL
+ + Jl - p - + (b - h* ) .  Since Jl - Jl m m 
- + -B and Jl (b - h* ) (I+) 
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(b - h* )[m,n] = B+ - mh*, this inequality becomes 
m - - B+ - mh* - B+ p(N) - (.!!!....::....l ) A  2 -B - + b - h* = -B - -+ b , i. e. (lb ) .  m m m m m 
It is straightforward to verify that the surpluses are as given in 
(2b ) and (3b ) . QED 
A 
Lemma 2 ,4 Let b and r be as in Lemma 2 .2 .  If the incumbent favors 
A 
the issue, the allocation r is conditionally optimal for him. 
.f!'.22! We must show that no other allocation can increase the 
incumbent ' s  surplus . Suppose that such an allocation, z, did exist, 
and consider the vectors (potential allocations for the challenger) 
yi = zi + pi for i E [m,n] ,  = 0 otherwise, and yi' = zi + pi+ bi for 
i e [1,m] , = 0 otherwise. 
If (1) of Lemma 2 .3 holds these vectors must satisfy y[m,n] l A, 
y'[l,m] L A, since otherwise the challenger would win; hence, from the 
definitions of y and q (from the proof of Lemma 3 .3 )  it follows that 
A 
(z + p)[m,n] = y[m,n ]  L A= q[m,n] = (r + p)[m,n] ,  whence 
A A 
z[m,n] L r[m,n] ;  similarly z[l,m] l r[l,m] , from the definitions of y '  
and q ' . Moreover, since by hypothesis z increases the incumbent ' s  
A 
surplus, z(N) < x(N) . These inequalities together imply 
A A 
z[l,m) < r[l,m) , z(m,n]  < r(m,n] ,  zm > rm . From the second of these, 
A 
there must exist a voter i• > m for which zi* < ri*' and since 
A A A 
ri* + pi* i rm + pm by the construction of r, it follows that 
A 
zi* + pi* < rm+ pm . Hence, taking C as the maj ority coalition 
C = [l,m) U {i* ) ,  we have (z + p)(C ) = (z + p)[l,m) + zi* +pi* < 
A A A 
(r + p ) L l,m) +rm+ pm= (x + p)[l,m] . Hence, by opposing the issue 
and bidding yi' = zi + pi+ bi for i e [1,m], the challenger's cost 
" 
46 
would be y'[l,m] = (z + p + b)[l,m] < (x + p + b)[l,m] = q'[l,m] =A, 
i.e. he would win, a contradiction of the hypothesis that z increases 
the incumbent's surplus . 
If the inequality (1) does not hold, then an allocation z 
which increases the incumbent's surplus would have to satisfy 
y[m,n] > q[m,n], y'[l,m] > q'[l,m], and z feasible would imply 
" 
z(N) i A =  x(N) . By analogous reasoning, these inequalities imply 
y[m,n] = (z  + p )[m,n] ( q[m,n], and hence that the challenger could 
increase his surplus, and therefore decrease the incumbent's surplus, 
by also favoring the issue and bidding yi for i E [1,m]. Hence, no 
allocation z can increase the incumbent's surplus, so long as he 
favors the issue . QED 
Lemma 2 .S .  Let b be a controversial issue which is "small ,"  It is 
optimal (uniquely optimal, respectively) for the incumbent to favor 
the issue if and only if b(N) 2. 0 (b(N) > 0 ,  respectively) . 
.f!:2!!1 It the incumbent favors the issue his conditionally optimal 
surplus is given by Lemma 2 .3 ,  in view of Lemma 2 .4 .  Conversely, 
opposing the issue b is equivalent to favoring the issue b• = -b; 
hence the conditionally optimal allocation x• and surpluses can be 
obtained by applying Lemma 2.3 to the issue b*. 
Denote various quantities appearing in Lemma 2 .3 by 
- + m - 1 - B - B P = p(N) - (�m�) A, Q = [B - -;;;-J ,  R E  [B +-;;;- - bm] '  (Thus if 
bm i m
b�N\ the incumbent wins iff P 2. -Q, etc . )  Let Q• and R• b e  the 
corresponding quantities for the issue b* = -b. Evidently bm* = -bm 
and b*(N) = -b(N) , Moreover since B•+ is b*[m•,n•] when voters are 
arranged in order of increasing bi•*• or equivalently (since 
bi
• = -bi) ,  in order of decreasing bi' evidently [m
•,n•] consists of 
the voters [1,m] when voters are reordered so that bi+l 2. bi, i. e. 
B*+ b*[m•,n•] = -b[m•,n•] = -b[l,m] = -B- . By the same reasoning, 
- + - + B* = -B • Hence Q• - B* + B = [B• - -] = [-B + -] and 
R* 
m m 
+ -- B*  + B [B* + - - b* ] = [-B - -+ b ] • m m m m 
Consider first the case b ( ....!U.NL1 • If the incumbent favors m m -
the issue he wins iff P 2. Q, and his surplus is P + Q or .!!!( p  + Q) if n 
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he wins or loses, respectively . Alternatively, if he opposes it (i. e. 
favors b* = -b ) then since b* m 
=l!.1N}_ _ b•(N) parts (b ) of -bm > m - 1 - m - l' 
Lemma 2 .3 applying, i. e. the incumbent wins iff P 2. -R•, and his 
surplus is P + R• or 1!! (p + R•) .  respectively, n 
If P 2. max (-Q,-R• ) the incumbent wins in either case, so it 
is optimal to favor iff the surplus by favoring is at least as large 
as that when opposing, i. e. P + Q 2. P + R•, i. e. Q 2. R• . If 
P ( min (-Q,-R• ) he loses in both cases, and the same condition 
follows . If -Q i P < R* the incumbent can win only by favoring, so 
that position is uniquely optimal, while if -R• i P ( Q he wins only 
by opposing, so it cannot be optimal to favor the issue. These 
assertions together imply that it is optimal for the incumbent to 
favor the issue if and only if Q 2. R•, i, e. 
B B
- - + - -;;;- s Q, or equivalently bm i B + B 
R• = -B+ - IL + b i m m 
b(N) + bm' i. e. b(N) 2. O .  
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If b > b ( N)l then by the same reasoning it is optimal for the m m -
incumbent to favor b if and only if R 2 Q•, i,e,  
- B+ + B+ B + -;- - bm 2 -B + -;-• or equivalently b(N) 2 0 ,  again. 
..hl.fil._ b • ( N) The final possibility is b = 1 , in which case b • = 1 m m - m m -
so parts (a) of Lemma 2 .3 apply to both b and b• , It will then be 
optimal for the incumbent to favor b* iff Q 2 Q•, i.e.  
- + B + B .!!1.....::J. -B - - > -B + -, or equivalently 0 � ( ) [B  m - m m 
(m - 1 ) [b(N) + b ] = (.!!..:J.) [b(N) + ..hl.fil._] m m m m - 1 
(m : 1 > Cm - � + 1) b(N) , i, e,  b(N) 2 O. QED 
+ B+] 
We may summarize these various results as follows : 
Theorem 2.2 Let b be a controversial issue which is "small. " It is 
optimal for the incumbent to favor the issue if and only if b(N) 2 O, 
i.e.  the issue is socially beneficial, If the incumbent uses an 
optimal strategy, either position is optimal for the challenger. The 
outcome and surplus to the winning candidate will be as given in Lemma 
2 .3 . (Analogous results for the case b(N) � 0 are obtained by 
applying these assertions to a new issue b' = -b , )  
3 ,  Eauilibrium 
Let us now think of the incumbency premiums as prices or 
const ituent demands , under the control of the individual voters or 
groups . Voter i, by raising or lowering his price pi' makes himself 
less or more available to the challenger, which may in turn affect the 
out come of the elect i on, and the payoff he subsequently receives; he 
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will attempt to set his price to ensure as large a payoff as possible. 
All prices are assumed fixed in advance of the election, The two 
A A 
parties then choose optimal allocations x, y, and after the election 
A A 
each voter will receive a payoff of vi = xi or vi = y, depending on 
which party wins. The optimal allocations are not necessarily unique, 
so for each p there will be a set V(p ) C It n of possible n-tuples of 
payoffs to voters, one for each possible winning optimal allocation, 
Each voter or group i is assumed to have well-defined (though not 
necessarily complete, or transitive) preference over the sets of 
possible payoffs or, equivalently, over the n-tuples p. These 
> 
preferences are representable by a binary preference relation -,  with 
i 
strict preference > and indifference - being defined iu the usual way. 
i i 
We can now define an equilibrium, in the obvious fashion. As 
a matter of notation, to focus on variations in some voter i ' s  premium 
pi' we denote by p_i the 
(n-1) -tuple (pi' ' ' ' ' pi-l ' Pi+l ' ' ' ' '
pn) '  and by 
(pi, p-i) the full n-tuple (p1 , • • •  , pi' ' ' ' ' pn) ,  
Definition 3 .1 . An n-tuple p I! JR n is an equilibrium if for no voter 
, , 
i is there a price P .  such that (p . ,  p , )  > (p , ,  p , ) . - - 1 1 -1 i - 1  - i  
Some price vectors satisfying this definition are of limitea 
interest, For example, if all prices were set so high that the 
incumbent could win with the allocation x = 0 ,  no voter would receive 
a positive payoff. If no voter could affect this by changing his own 
price alone, then we have a sort of "equilibrium by default, "  despite 
the fact that the payoff to every voter is zero. We shall say such an 
so 
equilibrium is degenerate : to  be more precise, let vi(p) be the 
maximum possible payoff to i at p, i. e. vi(p) max vi" We then 
v e v<P >  
define 
Definition 3 .2 . An equilibrium p is degenerate if 
- - , , 
vi(p ) = 0 = vi(pi' p_i) for all i and all pi . 
The following property will be useful : 
A 
Lemma 3 .1 Suppose there exists a nontrivial optimum x � 0 for the 
incumbent . 
allocationa 
If pi• = 0 for any i• S N then there exist optimal 
A A 
x' S X(p) ,  y' S Y(x'; p)  such that vi•(x', y'; p)  > O .  
.lI2.2.f Let voters be indexed and r and ( defined as in Lemma 1 .4 ,  with 
A 
respect to some optimal allocation x .  If r > m then (4) o f  Lemma 1 .4 
applies, ao i < ( implies pi 2 u > O .  Hence, since pi• = 0 ,  it 
follows that i• e [(, r], which implies the result. 
Otherwise, if r i m, since qx > 0 (from (3) of Lemma 1 .4 and r 
the definition of r) , it must be true that i• .{ r (for i• > r would 
A A A 
imply xi• = 0 and hence that q�• a 0 < q: which is inconsistent with 
the indexing of votes) ,  
A A A x x If x1• > 0 then 0 < qi• .{ � (from (3) of 
Lemma 1 .4 and the fact that i• .{ r .{ m) , again implying the 
conclusion. 
A A 
The remaining possibility is 0 = x i • q�• · Consider the 
allocation 
A Xi - B for i S T 
x'i t e  for 
i i•, 
0 otherwise 
A A A A 
Sl 
where T = {i: xi > O} C [l, m] and t = #T. 
x x x Since qi• = 0 < qr i qmt-1 
= pm+l using (3) of Lemma 1 .4 and the fact that r < m + 1 ,  for 
sufficiently small E > 0 it will still be true that q�; = tt < pm+l 
A 
x' x x' and qi i qi .{ pm+l = qi+l ' for all i < m so [1 , m] is still a least-
A x' � cost coalition, and evidently x'(N) =x(N) , q [1, m] = q [1 , m], 10 x' is 
also optimal. But then vi(x', y) = x'i =ta > 0 for any y if the 
A 
incumbent wins, while if the challenger wins there exists an optimal y 
A A x' such that vi(x', y) = yi = qi =ta > O .  QED 
The degenerate equilibria can now be completely characterized 
by the following result : 
Lemma 3 .2 , For any p let voters indexed so that pi .{ pi+l ' for all 
i. Then p is a degenerate equilibrium if and only if ei ther 
(1) p[l, m-1 ) L A, or alternatively 
( 2 )  R[mtl , n ]  .{ - A. 
Proof If : For any i and p' i let p' = (p' i' pi) ,  For any C E  M
• 
- -
evidently p'(C) L p'(C - {i} ) = p(C - {i} ) � p[l , m  - 1 ) , 
from the indexing and the fact that pi' £ o .  Hence if (1) above holds 
then (3 ) of Lemma 1 .2 also holds, so the incumbent wins and his 
A A A A 
uniquely optimal allocation i s x = O ,  whence V(x , y; p') = 0 all x E X, 
whence V(p') = 0 for any such p' . By an analogous argument 
p'(C) i p[m + 1 , n ]  for all C E  M•, so (2) above implies (3) of Lemma 
A 
1 .1 and hence that the challenger wins and y = 0 is uniquely optimal, 
whence V ( p ' ) = O .  
Only If : Suppose neither ( 1 )  nor (2 )  were true.  Choose p ' m = 0 ,  and 
designate by [ 1 ' ,m'] and [m' ,n ']  coalitions which minimize p ' ( C )  and 
maximize J! ' ( C) over C E M•, respectively ( identified by reindexing 
voters in order of increasing p ' i) ' Since (1 )  fails, A )  p [l,m - 1] 
p [l,m - l] + p '  = p ' [l,m] L p ' [l ' ,m'] .  Similarly, since (2)  fails, m 
5 2  
-A < J?[m  + 1,n] = Jl [ m  + 1,n] + .llm' = Jl ' [ m,n] i p ' [ m' ,n '] ,  Hence ( 2 )  
of Comment 1 .1 holds, s o  there exists a nontrivial optimum for the 
incumbent . Since pm' =  0 Lemma 3 .1 implies vm(x,y;p ' )  > 0 for some 
A A - -
x E X, y E Y(x ;p ' ) ,  i. e. 0 < vm(p ' ) = vm(pm ' ,p-m) ,  so p is not a 
degenerate equilibrium. QED 
The non-degenerate equilibria are the ones of interest. To 
obtain a more explicit characterization of them, we introduce some 
slight additional structure on voter preferences .  Since each voter i 
is ultimately interested in maximizing his own payoff vi' his 
preferences over sets of payoff n-tuples are assumed to reflect this.  
, 
In particular, if V and V '  are two such sets such that vi L vi for all 
v E V, v' E V ' ,  then we shall say that V dominates V '  1.2! j.. 
Definition 3 .3 . Voter preferences are said to respect dominance if 
> 
p - p' whenever V ( p )  dominates V (p ' )  for i. 
i 
We then have : 
Lemma 3 .3 . Suppose voter preferences  respect dominance. If p is a 
nondegenerate equilibrium, then vi(p )  > 0 for every voter i. 
Proof Let voters be indexed so that pi � pi+l for all i. Suppose 
that p [ l,m] < A and J?[m,n] ) -A but that -; . (p )  = 0 for some voter j ,  J 
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Let p' . = 0, p'  = (p . ' ,J?j ) ,  Evidently pj ' = 0 � p .  and .I! . ' = 0 L R · • J J J J J 
so p ' [l,m] i p [ l,m] < A  and J? ' [m,n] L p [ m,n] > -A. Hence Lemma 3 .2 
applies, implying v . ( p )  > 0, i. e. -; , (p . ' ,J?j ) )  O = v . (p . •  J! . } , a J J J J J J 
contradiction of the hypothesis that p is an equilibrium. 
There are two remaining possibilities to consider : 
(1 ) : p [ l,m] L A: In this case, from Lemma 1 .2,  x = 0 is uniquely 
optimal for the incumbent, and the incumbent wins, so vi( p )  = 0 for 
all i, Since p is a nondegenerate equilibrium, from Lemma 3 .2 it must 
be true that p [l,m - 1] < A, and hence that 0 < pm = pm. But if we 
choose pm' = 0 it then follows from the ' only if' argument of Lemma 
3 . 2 that Vm(pm ' ,p-m) ) 0 = Vm(pm,p-m) ,  so p could not be an 
equilibrium. 
( 2) : J? [m,n] i -A implies that the challenger wins with y = 0 ,  whence 
V ( p )  = 0 which by an analogous argument leads to a contradiction of 
the hypothesis that p is an equilibrium. QED 
The set of price n-tuples which satisfy this necessary 
condition will be of interest later; they are in a sense " closer" to 
being in equilibrium than those for which vi(p )  = 0 for some voters ,  
More precisely, 
Definit ion 3.4 , A price vector p i s  "near eguil ibdum" if it i s  
contained in an open s e t  S on  which -;i (p ' )  > 0 for every i ,  a t  all 
p' e s .  
We now have 
5 4  
Theorem 3 . 1 .  A necessary and suffici ent con<lition for p to b e  "near 
equil ibrium" is that lpi I < a & min (A/m, l/n[A+p(N) ] )  for every i, 
Proof If : If the inequa l i ty holds then Theorem 1 ,4 appl ies .  It 
follows that a >  0 and xi = a - pi > 0 ,  all i i s  the incumbent ' s  
unique opt imal allocation, Moreover if  a = A/m the incumbent wins, so 
vi (p )  = xi > 0 ,  all i ,  If a < A/m the chall enger wins. Since 
q� = a > 0 for all i, any coal ition C such that #C = m is a minimum-
cost coal ition, and any al location of the form 
a 
Yi = 0 
for i e c 
otherwise' 
for any such C, is opt imal , Since every i belongs to some such C it 
follows that -; i(p) = a > 0 for all i ,  Cl early the inequal ity, and 
hence the conclusion V(p ' ) > 0 al so holds on some nei ghborhood of p, 
Only If : To prove the converse suppose p i s  near equil ibrium and that 
the incumbent wins, but that pl < -A/m, Without loss of generality we 
can suppose that p1 < Pz < • • •  < pn ( repl acing the ori ginal p by a 
nei ghboring one, if necessary) , p near equil ibrium impl ies v1 (p )  > 0 
and hence that x1 ) 0 for some optimal al loca tion x, which again 
without loss of generality we can suppo se to be of the form xi > 0 iff 
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xi + pi
= a for some a > 0 (From Lemma 1 ,4 thi s  fol lows immediately if 
r > m, while if r i m  a reallocation of x(N) among { i :  xi > O} wil l 
create a new optimal allocation of this  form) . Since the incumbent 
wins and ( 1 ,  ei ther a i A/m ( if r i m) or a =  A/m ( if r > m) , Let 
xl 
a = (n  _ l )  and def ine a new al location x '  by x1 = 0 ,  x '  i = xi + e 
otherwise, Cl early x ' ( N) = x (N) , and evidently [ 1 ,m] i s  still a 
l ea st-cost coal ition, so x optimal impl ies 0 L qx 1 [l , m] - qx [ l ,m] 
xl -a + ( m  - l ) e ,  which (us ing e = (n _ l )  
( a - pl) 
(n _ l )  ) in turn impl ies 
p1 L -a L -A/m, a contradi ction of the original hypothes i s  that 
pi < -A/m, The al ternative hypothesis, that pn > A/m would l ead to a 
similar contradiction. Hence, from the indexing, -A/m i pi i A/m, all 
i. Since the incumbent wins i t  follows from Theorem 1 .4 that 
1/n [A + p(N) ]  L A/m and hence that lpi l i min CA/m, 1/n [A + p(N) ] )  
a, all i ,  
The other case ,  p near equil ibrium, challenger wins, is argued 
analogously, leading to the conclusion that lpi l i 1/n[A + p(N) ]  = 
min (A/m, 1/n [A + p (N) ] )  = a ,  Finally, if  I p .  I = a for any i ,  cl early 1 
the inequal i ty would not hold on any open ne ighborhood of p; hence p 
near equil ibrium impl ies the inequal ity is strict .  QED 
Note that when p i s  near equil ibrium the optimal al locations 
will be as given in Theorem 1 . 3 . Returning to the equi l ibria 
themselves, we have 
Lemma 3 .4 . Suppo se voter preferences respect dominance ,  If p is a 
nondegenerate equil ibrium, then 
( 1 )  l pi I < a a min (A/m, U/n ) [A + p (N) ] )  for all i, 
(2 )  p (N) � (.!!!::!) A, and m 
( 3 )  
"' 
s1 ( p )  � 0 
Proof ( 1) : From Lemma 3 .3 it must be true that v i (p) > 0 al l i, 
which from the necessity argument of Theorem 3 .2 impl ies (1) above .  
( 2) : From ( 1 )  above Theorem 1 .4 appl ies .  Hence p(N) > m -
1 A m 
would imply a = A/m, the incumbent wins, with a strictly po stive 
"' 
surplus s1 ( p )  = A  - x (N) > 0 ,  and his  unique opt imal al location i s  
5 6  
xi = A/m - pi ' a l l  i .  For some i
• l et pi• ' = pi• - a for some e > 0 ,  
and def ine p '  = (pi• ' •.l!i•) .  Cl early for suffici ently smal l a ( 1 )  wil l  
st ill hold, s o  the incumbent will st i l l  win, and h i s  unique optimal 
al location x '  wil l  be xi• ' =  xi• + a ,  xi ' 
= x1 for i I i• . Hence 
v i( x, y; p' )  = xi ' > xi = vi(x ' , y;p) for all optimal x, y, x ' ,y ' , so V(p ' ) 
dominates V (p )  for i and p could not be an equil ibrium. Hence 
p(N) � � m A. 
( 3 ) : m - 1 From ( 2) either p (N) = �m� A in which ca se (1 )  and Theorem 
"' 
1 .4 imply s1 ( p )  '"' 0 , or ehe p(N) < 
"' .m..=..J. A, implying s1 {p )  < 0 m QED 
Note that ( 3 )  impl ies, in parti cular, that either the 
chall enger w ins, or if the incumbent doe s  his  surplus i s  z ero. In 
view of ( 1 ) above and Theorem 1 .3 ,  the incumbent ' s  opt imal allocation 
will make every minimal winning coal ition a l east cost-coal ition to 
the chall enger, since #C = m impl ies qx(C) = a • m, Thus, if the 
chal l enger can win, he can do so with many optimal al loca tions (one 
for each such C) , and voter i ' s payoff win be either a > 0 or 0 ,  
depending on whether he happens to belong to the chosen coal ition or 
not .  I f  p and p '  are two vectors sati sfying (1) then i can receive 
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either zero or a po sitive payoff in e i ther case, so neither dominates 
the other. If a )  a ' , however, he receives a higher payoff whenever 
he belongs to the chosen coal ition, so there is a sense in which his 
payoff under p i s  conditionally better than that under p' . To put 
things more generally, let us def ine for any payoff vector v e 1R n the 
set of voters who receive posi tive payoffs, C(N) = { i :  v1 > O} , and 
for any set V of such payoffs l et (V) = {C (N) : v e V} . Then we 
shal l say that V conditionally dominates V' for i if ( V) 
i E C (v) = C(v' ) impl ies vi 2 vi ' for all v E V, v' E V. 
( V' )  and 
Definition 3 .5 . 
> 
Voter preferences respect conditional dominance if 
p - p' whenever V(p ) dominate s, or conditional ly dominates, V(p ' ) ,  for 
i 
i .  
Theorem 3 .2 . Suppose voter preference s respect condi tional dominance . 
If p i s  a nondegenerate equil ibrium. then : 
(1 )  l pi l < a = A/m = 1/n [A + p(N) ] ,  al l i. 
( 2) 
( 3 )  
(4) 
p (N) = m - 1 A m ' 
"' "' "'  
vi( x, y;p )  > 0 al l i and all x S X(p ) ,  y S Y(x;p) , and 
"' "' 
81 ( p )  = 0 = 52 ( p) • 
Proof (2) : From (1) and (2) of Lemma 3 .4 , l pi I < a ,  
m - 1 I p (N) � -- A, whi ch i s  equival ent to A m 2. 1/n [A + m 
all i, and 
p (N) ] = a. 
Suppose the inequal ity were strict. Then Theorem 1 .4 would imply : 
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the chall enger wins; hi s optimal al locations are {y:y i = a for i e c,  
= 0 otherwise, for some C C  N, #C = m} ; and hence that the conditional 
payoff to any voter i• i s  a if i• e C, 0 otherwise, for any such c. 
If pi• ' =  pi• + a ,  p '  = pi ' 'J!i) ,  then for suffici ently smal l e > 0 it 
m - 1 I will st ill be true that p ' ( N) < -m- A and pi• I < a , so by the same 
rea soning i• ' s  conditional payoff wil l be a' = 1/n [A + p ' (N) ] 
1/n [A + p (N) + £ ]  = a + e /n > a if i• S C, 0 otherwise, where again C 
range s over the set of coa l itions for which #C = m. Hence V(p ' )  
condi tionally dominates V(p ) ,  so p would not be a n  equil ibrium. Hence 
if p is an equil ibrium the inequal ity cannot be stri ct, i. e. 
p (N) .m...=....! A. m 
(1) : Follows from Lemma 3 .4 and (2) above. 
( 3 ) : From (1) and (2) above and Theorem 1 .4 it fol lows that the 
incumbent wins, and that his unique optimal allocation i s  
"" 
x = i a - pi > 0, all i. 
"" "" 
Hence vi(x,y;p )  = xi 
> O .  
( 4) : Fol lows from Theorem 1 .4 and (2) above. QED 
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FOOlNOTFS 
1 .  For exampl e, among many others, Downs (195 7 ) ,  Davis and Hini ch 
(1966 ) ,  Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970) ,  McKelvey and 
Orde shook (1970) ,  Kramer (1977) ,  (1978 ) , 
2 .  The more convent ional assumption, originating i n  Downs (195 7 ) , is 
that each candidate strives to maximiz e his probabil ity of 
victory, or perhaps his vote share. Pursuit of such goal s  i s  
purely instrumental in  Downs, however, being only a necessary 
step towards the candidate ' s  ul timate obj ective of enj oying the 
spoil s  of office, Our assumption that candidates are surplus 
maximiz ers thus more directly incorporates this ul timate goal 
into the analysis • 
3 .  Some indirect but neverthel ess sugge st ive evidence on chall engers 
versus incumbent s is reported by Hershey (197 ) .  She interviewed 
campaign managers and candidate s for congressional and statewide 
race s in Wisconsin during the 1 970 el ect ion, and found that most 
challengers (13 of 16 candidates, 17 of 18 campaign mana gers) 
would be satisf ied with a bare. minimal winning coal ition 
victory, whereas most incumbents (11 of 12 candida te s, 10 of 11 
campaign managers) would not, and strive for l arger margins. 
4 .  Compare, for exampl e, Fenno ' s  de script ion of the early, 
"expansioni st" stage of a congressman' s consti tuency career : "In 
the expansioni st stage • , • before [hi s ]  first el ect ion • •  
s .  
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the first step is to sol idify a primary consti tuency, a core of 
stronge st supporters who will carry a primary campaign, if 
necessary, and who wil l ,  in any ca se, provide the backbone for a 
general el ect ion campaign. The second step is to cul tivate the 
broader re-el ection consti tuency by reaching out for additional 
element s of support . •  (Fenno (1978 ) , pp, 172) . 
As Murray Kempton put s i t, in commenting on LBJ' s subsequent 
deemphasi s of the popul i st i ssue s on which he campai gned and won 
in h i s  f irst el ection, "To ge t elected i s  to become an incumbent, 
and to be an incumbent is to view with more al arm than hope any 
attempt to acquaint society ' s vict ims with their greivance s . "  
(Kempton ( 1983 ) ) .  
6 ,  There are two important qual ifica tions to thi s :  f irst, the 
chall enger' s advanta ge ari se s from the fact that the incumbent 
must commit himself  first . A chal l enger who attempted to 
direct ly interj ect an i s sue into the campaign himself would 
presumably find it difficul t to do so without at l east impl ici tly 
taking a position on it himsel f, in which ca se he would in effect 
be making the first commitment , so the incumbent would gain the 
advantage .  Moreover, a victorious chall enger becomes an 
incumbent in the next el ection, and the controversial issue which 
helps him now may return to haunt him in the future. 
7 .  Thurow, however, attributes the probl em to the l ack of party 
di scipl ine in the Uni ted State s .  In our analysi s both parties 
are in effect perfectly discipl ined, however; thus our analysis 
sugge st s the problem l ies deeper, in the nature of the 
competi tive electoral proce ss i tself. 
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8 .  One exception to thi s, of course, would be the pure "rent-seeldng 
society" (Kruger ) ) :  if there is no private sector there 
are presumably no underlying economic inequal ities, so equality 
in the provi sion of public benefits will indeed resul t in social 
equal ity. Expansion of the publ ic sector i s  thus one way of 
reconcil ing the otherwise confl icting ends of social equality and 
the equal ization of benefits .  
6 2  
REFERENCES 
Downs, A. 1 95 7 . An Economic Theory of Democ racy. New York, Harpe r .  
Dav is,  O. ; Hini ch, M. J. 1 966 . A mathema t i c a l  model of pol icy forma­
t i on in a democratic soci ety .  In Mathema t i c a l  Appl icat ions in 
Po l i t i c a l  Sc i ence II J . L. Bernd, ed. Dal l a s : S}RJ Pr e s s . 
Dav i s, O. ; Hinich, M. J . ;  and Orde shook, P . C .  1 970 . An e xpo sitory 
devel opment of a mathemat ical  model of the el ectoral proc e s s . 
Ame rican P o l i t ical Scienc e Review 2 : 426 -448 . 
Fenno , R.F.  1 978 . Home Style: House Members  in the ir Distric t s .  
Bo ston : L i t t l e  Brown. 
Hershey, M. R. 1 97 ? . Incumbency and the minimum w inning coa l i ti on. 
Ame r ican Journal o f  Po litical  Sc i enc e ? : 631-637 . 
Kempt on, M. 1 98 3 . The great l obby i s t . New York Review of Books, 
Februa ry 1 983 . 
Kramer, G . H.  1 97 7 . A dynamical model of pol i t i ca l  equi l ibrium. 
Journa l of Economic Theorv 16 : 3 10-3 3 4 .  
1 978 . Exi st ence o f  el ect oral equi l ibr i um .  I n  Game 
Theory and Po l i t ical  Science, P . C. Orde shook, ed.  New Yor k :  
NYU Pr e s s .  
Kruge r, A .  1 96 ? .  The rent- seeking s o c i ety .  Ame rican Economic Review.  
McKel vey, R.D. ; and Ordeshook, P.C.  1 970 . Symmetric spa t i al games 
without equi l ibria.  American Pol i t i c a l  Sc ienc e Rev i ew 
7 0 : 733-778 . 
63 
Sel l er s ,  C. 1 965 . The equil ibr ium cyc l e  in two-party po l i t i c s .  Pub­
l ic Opinion Quarterly 29 : 16-38 . 
Thurow, L. C. 1 980 . The Ze ro-Sum Soc i ety New York: B a s i c B ooks . 
